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Abstract 
 
Singapore’s growth from its independence in 1965 to present day is truly remarkable. 
Much of the country’s economic success is due to the policies and strategies implemented 
by the Singaporean government and its agency the Economic Development Board (EDB). 
These include active promotion and targeting of foreign multinationals (MNCs) to invest 
in the country, a dynamic sectoral allocation of industries, and a shrewd use of both 
skilled and unskilled foreign labor.  
As foreign investment into Singapore has increased throughout the years, so have the 
amount of foreign laborers in Singapore. The government has always had an open-door 
policy for foreign skilled workers aiding Singapore to achieve its goals of 
industrialization and subsequent upgrading. With economic growth, the need for low-
skilled foreign workers also emerged to maintain the country’s competitiveness. These 
workers would help to keep wages low, fill in labor shortages, and do menial jobs that 
Singaporeans would increasingly refuse to do.  
The aim of this paper is to show how foreign MNCs, skilled labor, and unskilled labor 
have intertwined in Singapore’s growth story, and the extent to which this foreign 
dimension has contributed to the story. The story begins in the early 1960s when 
Singapore first made the push for foreign MNC operations to invest in Singapore, but the 
authors’ analysis will mostly focus on the period post-1980 where data is more available 
on foreign MNCs and labor. 
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Chapter 1 Background/Problem Statement 
 
1.1 Singapore’s Early Development from 1819-1965. 
 
Singapore has always had a strong foreign influence to both its population and economic 
growth. Ever since its colonization and establishment as a trading post in 1819 by Sir 
Thomas Stanford Raffles and the British East India Company, Singapore has been a 
country of immigrants. The economic development of Singapore has been possible as a 
result of favourable initial conditions, such as geography and free trade policy established 
as a means to derive maximum benefits from its location (Huff, 1994). Singapore’s 
strategic location on the southern tip of Malayan Peninsula, from which it is separated 
only by a narrow strait, can be regarded as a natural resource that gave the country a 
competitive advantage. Throughout the 19th century Singapore was the main trading port 
of the Malayan Peninsular. It then gained more prominence after the opening of the Suez 
Canal that directed most of the ships going from Europe to the East through the Straits of 
Malacca (Grice & Drakakis-Smith, 1985).  
Foreign labor has played a significant role in the economy of Singapore from the 
country’s founding, as the descendents of Chinese, Indian, Indonesian, and Peninsular 
Malaysian immigrants would account for most of Singapore’s population growth from 
1819 until the beginning of World War II (Pang & Lim, 1982). The rise of foreign labor 
was fueled by both early economic growth as well as a lack of restrictions on foreign 
immigration. On the 28th of January 1819 when Sir Stamford Raffles landed on the island 
and established Singapore as a British settlement, the population amounted to about 150 
people, from which presumably 120 were Malays and the rest Chinese (Newbold cited in 
Swee-Hock, 2012). Within a year the population rose to 5000, mainly of Chinese descent 
(Raffles cited in Swee-Hock, 2012). Thereafter Raffles reported in his memoirs rapid 
population growth of the new colony, which by November 1822 amounted to over 10,000 
and by 1836 to 29,984 citizens. However, these numbers may be exaggerated on account 
of Raffles’ enthusiasm. According to Sir Thomas Braddell, the attorney general of the 
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colony the population amounted to only 5,874 in 1821 (Bradell cited in Swee-Hock, 
2012). Nevertheless, new citizens, mainly Malays and Chinese from Malacca but also 
Indians and Indonesians, were attracted by the prospects of profits in the new British 
trading center. Large number of Indians were transported to Singapore from the 
territories on the Indian subcontinent that were administered by Britain (Pang & Lim, 
1982).  
Raffles, keen to attract traders to his new colony, developed the land along the Singapore 
River to encourage its use as a port. To aid in his cause, this port of Singapore was 
declared to be a free port, unlike other regional ones at the time that had burdensome 
restrictions. As such, Singapore soon attracted junk traders from China, which 
consequently led to many Chinese settling on the island. In addition, traders, as well as 
indentured laborers and convicts came over from the Indian subcontinent to trade and 
settle in Singapore. The thriving free port of “The Lion City” spurned soaring population 
growth rates, and the period up to 1849 saw the highest growth rates in the demographic 
history of Singapore. From 1824-1840 the population grew at about 7.7 percent annually, 
and 4.6 percent from 1840 to 1849 (Hock cited in Chew & Lee, 1991). The data 
presented in Chart 1, adapted from Angus Maddison, traces the population of Singapore 
up until 1947. It wasn’t until a few years past World War II that the country surpassed a 
million inhabitants. 
Chart 1 Singapore’s Population (in 000’s) 1850-1947 
 
Source : (Maddison, 2010) 
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According to Pang and Lim (1982), large number of the Chinese, Indonesian and Indian 
immigrants were indentured until 1910, with transient males representing a significant 
share. A large disproportion by gender in the Singaporean population dates back to the 
early settlement. According to the census from 1836, female citizens constituted only 26 
percent of the population (7,729 out of 29,984). This impediment to future growth was 
regarded as a matter of great importance. The flow of Chinese immigrants, which 
constituted the largest group of immigrants, was strongly influenced by market conditions 
and infrequent colonial regulations, such as the Alien Ordinance implemented in 1933. It 
aimed to limit male immigration by setting quotas and at the same time encourage female 
immigration in order to normalize the sex ratio of the population (Pang & Lim, 1982). 
Since the large immigration of Chinese suited colonial needs, the British colonialists 
pursued a laissez-faire policy towards them until 1945. The first comprehensive policy 
concerning immigration was enacted in 1953. It tightly enforced the number and quality 
of immigrants coming to Singapore (Pang & Lim, 1982). However, the immigrants from 
Peninsular Malaysia were free to settle in Singapore until 1965, when the country became 
an independent nation state. 
The booming tin industry in the late 1800s and rubber industry in the early 1900s in 
neighboring Malaysia, demonstrated the importance of Singapore’s geographical 
location, caused a rise in its entrepôt trade, and consequently created a demand for 
workers. As such, more and more foreign workers came to settle in Singapore, the 
majority of which were Chinese. The increasing population size as well as the number of 
immigrants, provided the country with human capital, and contributed to the Singapore’s 
economic success. Following World War II, Singapore struggled with economic 
stagnation, as the country lost its role as a centre of Britain’s colonial trade movement 
(Grice & Drakakis-Smith, 1985). During the 1950s high unemployment between 10 to 15 
percent, intensified social problems. The rising unemployment was a result of stagnation 
in the trade sector that for a long time had been Singapore’s driving force. In order to 
tackle this problem, as well as to boost the economic development Singapore intiated an 
industrial program. The focus was initially on domestic market production, however the 
circumstances changed after the separation from Malaysia. Thereafter the focus shifted to 
the production of labor-intensive goods for the world market (Pang, 1980). 
 The Foreign Dimension of Singapore’s Economic Growth Elliot Formal 
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When Singapore achieved self-governance, the government started playing an essential 
role in encouraging economic development (Huff, 1994). Until then the administration 
mainly focused on maintaining peace and stability, conditions which would set the stage 
and prove necessary for future growth. In 1963, Singapore became independent from 
Great Britain and tried to create a federated union with Malaysia. However, after only 
two years and many unproductive discussions, Singapore and Malaysia parted ways with 
Singapore becoming an independent city-state. Amidst its newfound independence, 
Singapore faced a myriad of economic and social difficulties. The empowered People’s 
Action Party with Yusof bin Ishak as President, and Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister, 
had a lot of tough issues to tackle to get the country on the right track.  
The Singaporean leaders and the government agencies they created would set the stage 
for the country’s industrial upgrading, attraction of foreign investment and talent, and 
economic growth, which would transform Singapore from an entrepôt to a truly 
industrialized country. This paper will show, how, due to their efforts, foreign MNCs 
would come to dominate the economic landscape, and foreign skilled and unskilled labor 
would play a major part in economic growth. This foreign dimension: foreign MNCs, 
foreign skilled labor, and foreign unskilled labor would serve to reinforce each other to 
bring about an economic transformation in Singapore. 
1.2  Problem Statement 
Singapore’s strategies to advance its economic development were very successful, and its 
policies to promote foreign multinational investment contributed to the country’s success. 
The challenge is to analyze the data and show how the inclusion of MNCs and the 
increase of foreign skilled and unskilled workers affected the economic growth of 
Singapore. As such, our research question is: 
Question: To what extent has the invitation of foreign MNCs and foreign skilled and 
unskilled labor contributed to the growth of Singapore since its independence, with 
specific reference to post-1980? 
The question is phrased as primarily referencing post-1980 because the data before 1980 
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is, for the most part, not available. Consequently, although we can draw some inferences 
before 1980, it is more difficult to prove our points beyond doubt without the relevant 
data. This will be discussed forthwith in the following section on data sources. 
1.3 Data Sources in the Paper 
 
It is very important to note that the authors’ task of writing a paper on the impact of 
foreign labor (and the foreign MNCs) on Singapore’s growth is significantly hindered by 
the limited data that is available on population movement and foreign labor statistics. 
Singapore is secretive about such data, regarding it as “sensitive” (Low, 1995; Chia, 
2011) and does not fully reveal the amount of, nor the source of its foreign workers 
because of political considerations (Low, 1995). 
Through extensive research, the authors realized that the amount of information on 
foreign labor post-1980, although still lacking in many regards, is more available than the 
information from 1960 to 19801. As Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) 
started pushing for MNCs to invest in Singapore in the 1960s, and as some large foreign 
firms began operations in the country shortly thereafter, the authors were at a loss in 
understanding why there is hardly any information available on the subject during the 
1960-1980 period. Academic and Singaporean data sources offered little insight on the 
matter. Consequently the authors queried Dr. Lee Soo Ann, an economist who has been 
involved in the Singaporean government, business, and academic spheres for more than 
40 years. Dr. Lee worked with Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the Singaporean Minister of Finance 
in the late 1960s, and has served as a board member of the Port of Singapore Authority, 
Jurong Town Corporation, and NTUC Income, among others. He was also the Dean of 
Accountancy and Business Administration and Director of the School of Management in 
the National University of Singapore (NUS). Dr. Lee responded in an email,  
“The brief answer to your question is that there was little ‘foreign’ labour before 
1980. There were foreigners, but they were from Malaysia, and Singapore tends 
to regard those from Malaysia as if they are Singaporeans. Under British rule up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although post-1980 data is more available, the reliability of said data is often questionable. This will be 
touched upon shortly. 
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to 1963, there were no restriction on persons from the Malayan mainland coming 
to, and staying in Singapore, and of course there were none when Singapore was 
part of Malaysia from 1963-65.  
After independence in 1965, foreigners needed a permit to enter Singapore for 
employment but permits were liberally given to those from Malaysia. Malaysian 
citizens contributed to the CPF like Singaporeans and were even allowed to buy 
HDB flats2. Many who came from China married Singaporean Chinese, making it 
difficult to distinguish them. Hence the statistics do not show that there were 
many foreigners in Singapore.    
The number of Malaysians dried up as a source of foreign labour during the 1980s 
(they went to Australia, etc.) and in 1990, foreign supply was opened to non-
traditional sources like the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, etc. on 
a work permit basis for those less skilled (with a levy), and on an employment 
pass basis to those who were professionals and executives. They are generally not 
allowed to contribute to the CPF and not many qualify to be permanent residents.  
The MNCs did not become that numerous until the 1980s, when business services 
and financial services became two engines of growth. Only in the manufacturing 
sector were MNCs significant in the 1970s. In the 1960s, MNCs were not 
significant in trade, which was the fourth engine of growth. As a rule, statistics do 
not cover MNCs in the areas that they were not significant. The same goes for 
foreign skilled labour.  
The reason why foreign skilled labour and employment passes are not covered 
currently, is because the Singaporean educated sees them as competing away their 
jobs as PMET (professional, managerial, executive and technical). The 
government is currently about to raise the income foreigners need to earn in order 
to get employment passes, so that locals are protected from foreign competition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The CPF refers to Singapore’s Central Provident Fund which was the government’s savings plan initiated 
in 1955. The HDB refers to Singapore’s Housing and Development Board, established in the 1960s, which 
is responsible for public housing in the country. 
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Today, of the 1.5 million foreigners, about 400,000 are from Malaysia (the other 
major foreign group are the Chinese, numbering also about 400,000). Although 
many Malaysians have become citizens, there are many who retain their 
Malaysian citizenship as they can then own land in Malaysia.”  
As such, the paper is organized into two parts; the first analyzes the foreign dimension of 
MNCs and labor between 1960 to 1980, and the second from 1980 to present. While the 
section analyzing the effect of foreign MNCs and labor on the growth of Singapore from 
1980 to present relies on many data sources, the previous section from 1960 to 1980 
focuses more on qualitative data and hypotheses on the data. In addition to more data 
available from 1980 to present, there is also significantly more foreign investment, 
foreign labor (both skilled and unskilled), and foreign MNCs attracted to Singapore in 
this period than in the period from independence to 1980. As such, the second part of the 
paper, focusing on foreign labor and MNCs from 1980 to present, is split into two 
chapters: the foreign dimension in the 1980s, and that from the 1990s to present.   
This paper relies on a variety of informational and data sources to support its conclusions. 
These include: 
• Singapore census data, which show population growth trends and from 
which time series data can be extrapolated. The first census post-
independence took place in 1970. It is also important to note that these 
must be read carefully: reporting changes occurred after the 1990 census, 
the 2000 census only reveals information on the resident population, not 
separating the foreign and domestic population, and the 2010 census 
excludes large numbers of the country’s unskilled labor (Chia, 2011). 
• Singapore Ministry of Manpower (MOM) statistics, which show the 
employed resident and foreign workers by sector and to some extent the 
GDP growth attributable to residents and nonresidents. However, the 
Ministry does not always release information regarding the amount of 
employment passes and work permits that have been issued. 
• Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS) data on the GDP contribution of 
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foreign firms and labor. Though, outward remittances are not identified, 
and not listed on the country’s balance of payments (Chia, 2011). 
• Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) which includes 
historical information on the mindset and process of wooing foreign 
investors and skilled workers. The EDB sources also have relevant 
information on MNCs in Singapore and the steps that must be taken to 
invest in the country. 
• Singaporean newspapers, such as the Straits Times, which include 
information on foreign labor, and opinionated pieces on the topic. These 
must be taken with a grain of salt, as the media is to a large extent 
controlled by the government. Indeed, an international assessment of press 
freedom produced by Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), a French media 
organization, ranked Singapore as number 141 among 169 countries in 
2007, by far the lowest of all advanced economies
 
(Reporters Without 
Borders, 2007). 
• The World Economic Forum and the International Institute for 
Management Development, which provide rankings and polls on global 
competitiveness and the attitudes of Singaporeans to certain issues. 
• Official statements from key members of the Singaporean government 
regarding foreign MNCs and labor. 
• Media and NGO reports that relate to foreign workers. These include for 
example, Human Rights Watch, which has shown the abuses faced by 
low-skilled labor in Singapore. 
• Academic papers which have attempted to fill in some of the gaps of the 
“missing” data by estimating certain markers, and also providing theory 
on foreign labor.  
By glancing over the sources to be used, one can see difficulties in reaching irrefutable 
conclusions. Many data markers that one would normally expect to be available in a 
developed country are not available in the case of Singapore. Much of this information is 
kept internally, for three reasons: (1) Singapore does not see the necessity of revealing 
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the information, (2) to protect political interests with regard to foreign policy, and (3) to 
protect domestic policy interests.  Each of these three will be briefly touched upon in 
turn. 
First, Singapore was part of the East Asian “miracle,” in which countries in the region 
achieved incredible growth levels by defying conventional logic, thriving without the 
supposed prerequisite of democracy. Singapore was thrust into independence as a 
developmental state, and has continued to thrive as an autocratic state with palpable 
governmental influence over things such as the media and the right to freedom of speech. 
As such, the government has the final decision on what information it deems appropriate 
to reveal.  
With regard to the second reason, foreign policy, Singapore has always been a melting 
pot of cultures and workers because of its geographic location. This led to Singapore’s 
growth in the transhipment trade, and its status as a gateway to Asia and a bridge from 
the West to the East. In recent years, Singapore has played host to migrant workers from 
many Asian countries, which has at times led to strained relationships with these 
countries. For example, a Filipino maid, Flor Contemplacion, was hanged in Singapore in 
1995 after being charged for a double murder, leading to a drastic rift in the relationship 
between the two countries (Yeoh, et al., 1999). Prior to the incident the economic ties 
between the two countries were at an all-time high. Singapore exports to the Philippines 
more than doubled between 1992 and 1995, from US$809 million to US$1.9 billion. 
Philppine exports to Singapore increased more than threefold in the same period, from 
US$317 million to US$1.1 billion (IMF cited in Yeoh, et al., 1999). Yet, soon after the 
hanging, economic relations between the countries turned sour. Singaporean investments 
in the Philippines fell from a record US$65 million in 1994, to US$3.7 toward the end of 
1995 (Yeoh, et al., 1999).  
The Singaporean government has tried to protect its interests by not being very 
forthcoming in terms of revealing accurate foreign labor statistics, which presents a 
number of problems for the authors in their research. For example, in 1990, the 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration acknowledged only 11,000 total 
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Filipino workers in Singapore, while the Philippine Embassy put the number of Filipina 
domestic workers alone at 70,000 to 80,000 (Yeoh, et al., 1999). This presence of illegal 
migrant workers complicates data research. In addition, Singapore’s annually issued labor 
statistics only show the trend in aggregate foreign labor since 1991 and sectoral 
distribution, while paying no regard to source country, occupation, or gender (Chia, 
2011). As Singapore has a vested interest in protecting its political and economic 
relationships with its Asian trading partners, it has not had the desire to acknowledge all 
of the foreign labor that exists within its borders.  
Finally, referring to the third reason, Singapore’s data does not accurately nor completely 
encompass all of the foreign skilled labor so as to protect domestic political interests. As 
Dr. Lee mentioned, many Singaporeans feel that foreign skilled workers are taking jobs 
away from them. This has led to criticism and disgruntlement in recent years among the 
educated Singaporeans, who have to seriously compete for jobs, and has caused some to 
emigrate from Singapore. 
1.4 Definitions of Important Terms    
The paper focuses on the impact of foreign multinational companies (MNCs) and foreign 
labor on the economic growth of Singapore. As such, it is important to clarify what the 
authors mean by these terms. Multinational companies, also referred to as multinational 
corporations or multinational enterprises, are “firms that engage in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by directly controlling and managing value-adding activities in other 
countries” (Peng, 2014, p. 5). To be classified as a multinational company, a firm must be 
engaged in the management of foreign assets through either the production of goods or 
services (Gooderham, et al., 2013). As such, those simply investing in foreign assets, 
such as hedge funds investing in foreign stock markets, would not be sufficient to warrant 
the term multinational company (Gooderham, et. al., 2013).  
In addition, it is essential to distinguish between different types of foreign labor in 
Singapore. For the purpose of this paper, we are considering that there are only two types 
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of labor, skilled and unskilled labor3. Depending on this labor classification, Singapore’s 
policies toward foreign workers have been radically different.  
Normally the distinction between skilled workers and unskilled workers is based on 
education; skilled workers are those with a college degree, while unskilled workers have 
no college education (Sill, 2002; Krusell, et al., 2000). However, many other sources also 
consider skilled workers as those who have acquired significant experience in a certain 
area, but the categorization remains not well defined and can vary from country to 
country (Iredale, 2000). The OECD offers a broad definition of skilled workers to 
include: “highly skilled specialists, independent executives and senior managers, 
specialized technicians or tradespeople, investors, physicians, business people, 
'keyworkers' and subcontract workers” (OECD 1997:21 cited in Iredale, 2000, p. 883). 
Skilled labor is needed for countries to accumulate technological and skill-based 
advantages, and skilled workers are needed to train other aspiring skilled workers 
(Krusell, et al., 2000). Workers who have attained higher education levels, greater skills, 
and more knowledge earn higher wages than those who haven’t (Sill, 2002). The 
difference in wages between high-skilled and low-skilled workers is referred to as the 
skill premium.  
One metric for showing inequality within a country is the Gini Coefficient. Table 1 
shows the Gini Coefficient for OECD countries since the mid-1970s, where the data is 
available.  
Table 1 Gini Coefficient after taxes and government transfers 
  mid-70s mid-80s around 
1990 
mid-90s around 
2000 
mid-
2000s 
late-
2000s 
Slovenia  ..   ..   ..   ..   ..  0.246  0.236  
Denmark  ..  0.221  0.226  0.215  0.226  0.232  0.248  
Norway  ..  0.222  ..  0.243  0.261  0.276  0.250  
Czech Republic  ..   ..  0.232  0.257  0.260  0.268  0.256  
Slovak Republic  ..   ..   ..   ..   ..  0.268  0.257  
Belgium  ..  0.274   ..  0.287  0.289  0.271  0.259  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The term semi-skilled labor occassionally is used by sources that will be cited in the paper. Semi-skilled 
labor presents a difficult classification, and as such the authors have chosen to only focus on skilled and 
unskilled labor.  
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 mid-70s mid-80s around 
1990 
mid-90s around 
2000 
mid-
2000s 
late-
2000s 
Finland 0.235  0.209   ..  0.218  0.247  0.254  0.259  
Sweden 0.212  0.198  0.209  0.211  0.243  0.234  0.259  
Austria  ..  0.236   ..  0.238  0.252  0.265  0.261  
Hungary  ..   ..  0.273  0.294  0.293  0.291  0.272  
Luxembourg  ..  0.247   ..  0.259  0.261  0.258  0.288  
France  ..  0.300  0.290  0.277  0.287  0.288  0.293  
Ireland  ..  0.331   ..  0.324  0.304  0.314  0.293  
Netherlands 0.263  0.272  0.292  0.297  0.292  0.284  0.294  
Germany  ..  0.251  0.256  0.266  0.264  0.285  0.295  
Iceland  ..   ..   ..   ..   ..  0.257  0.301  
Switzerland  ..   ..   ..   ..  0.279  0.276  0.303  
Poland  ..   ..   ..   ..  0.316  0.349  0.305  
Greece 0.413  0.336   ..  0.336  0.345  0.321  0.307  
Korea  ..   ..   ..   ..   ..  0.306  0.314  
OECD Total  ..   ..   ..   ..   ..  0.316  0.314  
Estonia  ..   ..   ..   ..   ..  0.349  0.315  
Spain  ..  0.371  0.337  0.343  0.342  0.319  0.317  
Canada 0.304  0.293  0.287  0.289  0.318  0.317  0.324  
Japan  ..  0.304   ..  0.323  0.337  0.321  0.329  
New Zealand  ..  0.271  0.318  0.335  0.339  0.335  0.330  
Australia  ..   ..   ..  0.309  0.317  0.315  0.336  
Italy  ..  0.309  0.297  0.348  0.343  0.352  0.337  
United Kingdom 0.268  0.309  0.354  0.336  0.352  0.331  0.342  
Portugal 0.354   ..  0.329  0.359  0.356  0.385  0.353  
Israel  ..  0.326  0.329  0.338  0.347  0.378  0.371  
United States 0.316  0.337  0.348  0.361  0.357  0.380  0.378  
Turkey  ..  0.434   ..  0.490   ..  0.430  0.409  
Singapore  ..   ..   ..   ..  0.434  0.449  0.452  
Mexico  ..  0.452   ..  0.519  0.507  0.474  0.476  
Chile  ..   ..   ..  0.527   ..  0.503  0.494  
Source: (OECD, 2013; Department of Statistics Singapore, 2013) 
A high Gini Coefficient represents high inequality within a country, and as such 
Singapore has high inequality. Of the industrialized economies shown in Table 1 above, 
Singapore has one of the highest Gini Coefficients. Theoretically, Singapore’s high, and 
widening, income gap could be due to rising wages for the highly skilled workers and 
depressed wages for unskilled workers due to low-cost foreign workers. By applying 
these theories through the recent history of Singapore, we infer certain challenges that 
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Singapore has faced through its economic growth. Since the 1960s, and moreso from the 
mid-1980s, the country has been involved in continual technological upgrading, which 
has required strong recruitment of skilled workers. As the skill gap has increased at a 
faster rate than the domestic supply of skills, the need for foreign skilled workers in the 
country has increased. Extensive experience with foreign skilled workers has led 
Singaporeans to refer to them as “foreign talent.” These workers augment Singapore’s 
human capital, and support the intended industrial policy by providing FDI and helping to 
establish a service sector (Thangavelu, 2013). On another note, the combination of these 
foreign skilled laborers training Singaporeans and Singapore’s own policies for training 
and educational upgrading have caused the skill level among Singaporeans to grow 
immensely. As a result, Singapore has emerged as an advanced and industrialized 
country, but has also been left with a scarcity of domestic low-skilled workers. 
Low-skilled workers are needed for a plethora of occupations in the country such as 
construction and domestic work. Due to the increasing skill levels among Singaporeans, 
many have become overqualified for these tasks themselves. In addition, hand-in-hand 
with increasing skill levels and economic growth has been a rise in wages. During certain 
parts of the late 20th century, Singaporean wages have risen at levels that were deemed 
too high to maintain the country’s global competitiveness. It has thus been necessary to 
attract more low-skilled workers from abroad to handle rising costs and the disclocating, 
or “hollowing-out” effects, that the MNCs have had on the Singapore economy 
(Thangavelu, 2013). 
The definition of a foreigner in statistics pertaining to Singapore would normally include 
foreign students, employees and their faimily members that have temporary permits, and 
those in the country on public affairs business (Miyamoto, 2006). Most permanent 
residents of Singapore are Malaysians that have been able to obtain permanent residency 
after attaining certain educational, skill, and income levels; yet permanent residents are 
not counted as foreigners in statistics (Miyamoto, 2006). Thus, workers that have 
Malaysian nationality, who have become permanent residents of Singapore, are treated as 
Singaporeans in statistics, and not as foreigners (Miyamoto, 2006). It makes the 
challenge of determining foreign labor influence on Singapore that much more difficult, 
as the statistics for foreigners are thus often underrepresented.  
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Chapter 2 Foreign MNCs and Labor 1960 to 1980 
2.1 Introduction: Brief History Leading up to Independence 
“If our experience can be used as a general guide to policy in other developing 
countries, the lesson is that the free enterprise system, correctly nurtured and 
adroitly handled, can serve as a powerful and versatile instrument of economic 
growth.” (Goh, 2013, p. xii) 
Since its founding by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819, Singapore was a British colony, and 
the capital of the British Straits Settlements. When Singapore gained self-governing 
status in 1959 the future of the small country was anything but clear. In the 1950s and 
early 1960s two camps of pundits emerged with divergent thoughts on the future of 
Singapore. On one side were the optimists who thought that Singapore had many positive 
attributes that would lead to a bright future. On the other side were those that felt that 
without British colonial rule Singapore was doomed to follow in footsteps of other 
flailing decolonized countries.  
Many chose to believe in this optimistic side, thinking that the country would continue on 
its path of promoting trade and economic growth. F. Benham, an academic observer of 
Singapore, wrote in 1957: “there seem to be no good grounds for supposing that stable, 
political and economic conditions will not continue. It is most unlikely that any 
government which comes to power will follow policies adverse to industry and trade” 
(Benham cited in Huff, 1994, p. 298). In 1959, The People’s Action Party (PAP) assumed 
power, and has been Singapore’s ruling party to this day. Following Benham’s statement, 
W.G. Huff wrote, “Even so, it would have been difficult to envisage the vigour of the 
post-1959 PAP economic development initiative, made possible by decolonization. The 
success of that initiative itself promoted political stability, but first it brought about 
striking economic change in the 1960s and beyond” (Huff, 1994, p. 298). 
For a short period, from 1963 to 1965, Singapore became a part of Malaysia. The idea 
was to form a Federation of Malaysia with Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. 
Separation between the two was attributed to differences in Malay and Chinese interests, 
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and various diverging political interests (Parmer, 1966). Regardless of the reasons 
involved, on August 9, 1965, Singapore became an independent republic. The uncertainty 
in the previous ten years caused some to join the camp believing that Singapore was 
doomed to struggle for years to come. One source writes, “When Singapore attained self-
government in 1959, the setting could hardly have been less auspicious. Singapore was a 
small island, with no natural resources, no hinterland to fall back upon, gripped with an 
endemic problem of mass unemployment and poverty” (Wong, 2007, p. 1). The broken 
ties with Malaysia led to an even more uncertain future. John Andrews of The Economist 
wrote, “With the link to the natural riches of Malaysia . . . severed, Singapore was 
doomed to live on the wits of its people. They were not a promising mix” (Andrews, 
1986, p. 4). At the time of independence, 70 percent of the country’s households were 
living in overcrowded conditions, unemployment was hovering around 14 percent, GDP 
per capita was less than $2,700, and roughly half of the population was illiterate (The 
World Bank, 2009). To provide a comparison, Singapore’s GDP per capita in 1965 was 
similar to those of Nicaragua, Guatemala, Iran, Lebanon, Ecuador, and Romania 
(Maddison, 2010).  
In the years following World War II, a wave of decolonization swept much of the world, 
leading to dozens of new and independent countries. In 1963, Singapore would finally 
become an independent country of its own, when it declared independence from its 
colonial master, Britain. The dismantling of colonialism is one of the long-term effects of 
the Second World War (Tenold, 2013).	  	  According to Palmer, et al. (2002), 
“Of all the great political changes in the history of the modern world, affecting 
hundreds of millions of people, nothing was more revolutionary, more dramatic, 
or more unexpected than the end of the European overseas colonial empires… But 
many of the new nations were nations only in a limited sense. They were 
sovereign territorial entities, internationally recognized, and with seats in the 
United Nations, but many of them lacked the internal coherence and shared 
experience of nations in the older sense of the world. Nor did nationhood for the 
most part bring democracy, civil rights or the rule of law.” 
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As the above passage suggests, many countries would struggle to establish their own 
national identities following decolonization. Many newly decolonized countries in Africa 
would struggle for many years amidst fights for power and in the hopes of achieving a 
national identity, and these countries would primarily do so without democracy, strong 
civil rights, and weak law systems.  
It is very interesting here to compare the divergent paths between many newly 
decolonized countries in Asia versus those in Africa. Many African countries that 
suddenly lost their colonial rule would be in shambles for decades to come. Singapore, 
along with some other Asian countries, was able to flourish following its decolonization, 
on its way to becoming an economic success story – a “miracle”. According to a paper 
comparing development in South East Asia with that of sub-Saharan Africa by Van 
Donge, Henley and Lewis (2012), Africans were much richer on average in the 1960s 
than South East Asians. Between 1960 and 2005, however, South East Asian economies 
grew at almost 6 percent annually while sub-Saharan African countries had an annual 
growth rate of 3.5 percent, with an even more pronounced contrast in per capita terms as 
population growth was higher in the African countries (Van Donge, et al., 2012). 
Consequently, people living in South East Asia were almost 2.5 times wealthier than 
those in Africa in 2005 (Van Donge, et al., 2012).  
Discusssing the problems following decolonization in Africa, Englebert writes, 
“Of all the regions in the world, Africa has the highest proportion of countries 
where the process of state creation was exogenous to their societies and where the 
leadership, or ruling class, inherited the state rather than shaping it as an 
instrument of its existing or developing hegemony… The state became therefore 
either a potential resource to be appropriated, or the possible instrument of the 
domination of other groups to be resisted.” (Englebert cited in Hagen, 2002, p. 
150)  
David Landes adds that, ”the energy, resources and potential goodwill of these successor 
states have been depleted in the process of defining themselves” (Landes, 1999, p. 436). 
As such, many countries in Africa faced many power and political struggles following 
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their decolonization that would diminish their economic resources and hinder possible 
economic growth.  
On the other hand, many countries in South East Asia would start to flourish following 
their decolonization, among them Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia. Although these 
countries were economically successful for a variety of reasons, chief among them were 
government policies which would serve to promote economic growth. Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia all promoted macroenomic stability and financial stability (for 
example, low inflation and exchange rate stability) (Van Donge et al., 2012). These 
countries would also promote education, especially at the primary level, and maintain 
stable political regimes.  
It is thus interesting to explore how Singapore – in the midst of decolonization, a new 
political regime, a failed union with Malaysia, newfound independence, and a plethora of 
social and economic problems – was able to turn its fortunes around and set the stage for 
sustained economic growth. A few positive inertias at the time would allow the country 
to flourish following its decolonization. Singapore’s geographic location and its 
experience with international trade were significant boons that would continue to enable 
the country’s growth and success. This allowed the country to reap significant economic 
benefits previously from both the tin and rubber industry in Malaysia. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the policies enacted by the government with regard to 
attracting foreign multinationals and foreign investment would enable Singapore to begin 
and maintain economic growth. 
2.2 Singapore’s Decision to Target MNCs 
In the 1950s and entering the 1960s, Singapore’s primary economic dilemma was 
unemployment. As such, the government was focused on job creation. Yet, as Grice and 
Drakakis-Smith (1985) point out, in 1959 Singapore was lacking a very important 
component: indigenous entrepreneurship and traditions in manufacturing that would 
foster the development of the country in the short run. So how could Singapore mobilize 
its underemployed workforce to create economic growth when the country lacked 
domestically important precursors to do so? 
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Subsequently, the newly empowered PAP asked the United Nations Bureau of Technical 
Assistance to send an Industrial Survey Mission to aid the country with its economic 
future. According to Dr. Lee, there was consultation between the UN Mission and those 
behind Singapore’s Development Plan of the early 1960s in terms of government and 
economic direction. The UN Mission, led by Dr. Albert Winsemius, proposed 
industrialization as the necessary means to promote both jobs and future economic 
success. To this effect, the UN Mission recommended the creation of the Economic 
Development Board (EDB) (Le Blanc, 2008). The EDB, established in 1961, is the 
country’s primary agency for economic planning and strategy to improve Singapore’s 
position as a global business and investment hub (Yuen, 2008). The UN Industrial Survey 
Mission also revealed that a substantial amount of job creation was necessary. For 
successful economic transition, 214,000 new jobs were needed for the 1960s, equating to 
roughly a 50 percent increase in the labor force (Yuen, 2008). The EDB was thus set up 
with substantial funds from the government and a mandate to aid in industrialization, 
economic development, and job creation. 
Singapore, like many of its Asian counterparts and other developing countries, first 
sought economic growth through import-substitution protection for “infant industries” 
based on pioneer industries and using advanced technologies from the West and Japan to 
get these new and advanced industries off the ground (Le Blanc, 2008). However, the 
period of import-substitution was short-lived, lasting only from 1959 through the early 
1960s. Singapore with its small labor force and small domestic market, realized the 
futility of import-substitution policies. Yet, during the 1960s the Singapore did not have 
adequate capital on its own to invest in its economy and infrastructure, and thus it was 
deemed essential to attract foreign capital (Siddiqui, 2010).  
Consequently, the strategy shifted rather rapidly to export development through 
promotion of MNC investment (Le Blanc, 2008). And so, while Malaysia and Thailand, 
with their much larger domestic markets, took the more common route of import-
substitution industrialization, Singapore was one of the first countries to seek out MNC 
investments in the early 1960s, owing to necessity (Natarajan & Juay Miang, 1992). The 
government realized the importance of creating an environment conducive to 
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industrialization, and the EDB was tasked with the the challenge of convincing foreigners 
to invest in the country (EDB, 2013a). A plan was created to provide incentives to 
foreign companies, and the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) and the Economic Expansion 
Act sought to create low cost production sites for foreign investors (Siddiqui, 2010). 
According to Goh Keng Swee, Singapore was one of the first Asian countries to attract  
and receive multinational companies and their investments in the early 1960s, when, at 
the time, the prudence of this strategy was often doubted (Natarajan & Juay Miang, 
1992).   
2.3 Motivations for Foreign MNCs to Invest in Singapore 
Thus, Singapore had the impetus to attract foreign investment to support industrialization, 
but what motive did foreign MNCs have for investing in Singapore? With recent 
decolonization from Britain, a new political party, and severed ties and an uneasy 
relationship with Malaysia, Singapore could hardly have been the most auspicious place 
for foreigners to invest their money.   
Nevertheless, Singapore had many attributes that enabled its success in attracting foreign 
investment. The country already had some manufacturing operations, many prerequisites 
for industrializations, and because of the entrepôt trade, fairly extensive infrastructure 
and a modern banking system. Together with the substantial supply of unemployed 
Singaporeans, most possessing some education, the country was ready for 
industrialization (Le Blanc, 2008). The Singaporean government also took steps to 
increase its pull for foreign investment. New laws were enacted which would lower labor 
costs and reduce labor union strikes, exchange rates and inflation were successfully 
managed, and tariffs on imports and duties on exports were set very low (Porter, et al., 
2008). 
The authors have compiled a list of attributes that made Singapore an attractive 
investment location for MNCs. These factors are adapted from Edgar Schein’s book 
Strategic Pragmatism, as well as a paper on foreign investment in Singapore by Teck-
Wong Soon and William A. Stoever. 
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- Geographic Location 
- Cultural Factors 
- Government Strategy and Attitudes 
• Political Stability and Business Orientation 
• Active but Limited Role of Government  
• Freedom from Bureaucratic Hassles 
- General Economic Factors 
• Abundance of Cheap Labor 
• Open Economy 
• Conducive Investment Climate 
- EDB Characteristics 
- Infrastructure 
While some of these attributes were already manifested in the 1960s, others have 
emerged in more recent decades. So although Singapore offered a strong incentive to 
MNC investment in the 1960s, its changing economy and policies have created even 
stronger motivations in subsequent decades. 
Geographic Location 
The geographic location of Singapore has been and will continue to be one of the 
country’s greatest assets. Its location originally caught the eye of Sir Stamford Raffles 
and the British in the early 1800s, and set the stage for Singapore’s entrepôt trade and its 
booming port. Later, the geographic location (as well as other incentives) would induce 
MNCs to make Singapore their regional headquarters for the South East Asian region. 
Although Singapore itself did not boast a large labor force or domestic market, its 
location made it ideal to access other Asian markets with large markets that offered 
customers, suppliers, and raw materials (Schein, 1997). 
Cultural Factors 
Due to its colonial ties with the British, Singapore had adopted English law, and 
accounting systems, as well as a population widely versed in the English language  
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(Schein, 1997). In the 1960s, at the time of independence, Singapore’s population 
consisted of mostly Chinese, a moderate proportion of Malays and Indians, and a small 
proportion of Westerners and others. “[Singaporeans] were industrious, thrifty, risk-
taking, amenable to training and industrial discipline, and eager to educate themselves 
and their children” (Soon & Stoever, 1996, p. 332). Many of these already had a 
significant background in trade, commerce, and banking from working in the 
transshipment trade, and would enable Singapore to move into a modern, industrializing 
climate.  
Government Strategy and Attitudes 
Political Stability and Business Orientation 
Although Singapore has never been a democratic nation, it has been linked to moderate 
political and economic leadership since its independence. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
was a strong leader for nearly thirty years of Singapore’s history, with a firm grasp on his 
country’s populace and capabilities. As such, he was able to take a long-view of political 
and economic decisions (Soon & Stoever, 1996) Even during Singapore’s tumultuous 
1950s and 60s, it was widely believed that Singapore’s government would continue to 
follow stable policies of pro-trade and industrialization.  
Since the late 1950s, the Singaporean government has shown a high degree of business 
orientation and proclivity to seek and want industry (Schein, 1997). Singapore showed 
early attention to labor-intensive, export-oriented investment in the 1960s, when 
Singapore’s separation from Malaysia forced the country to adopt new policies (Soon & 
Stoever, 1996). Consequently, Singapore became one of the first countries to seek and 
receive MNC investment. Finally, Singapore’s policies throughout the years have led to 
an near absence of corruption, providing a stable business environment for investors 
(Schein, 1997). 
Active but Limited Role of Government       
The Singapore government took an active role in shaping its development, by creating 
numerous government-owned corporations with certain industrialization objectives. The 
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government recognized preferred sectors over time that it sought to capitalize on, and 
attract investment into, and relied on incentives to reach its goals. As Soon and Stoever 
(1996, p. 332 ) write, “a number of state-owned corporations were established to promote 
various industrialization objectives, but even these were supposed to operate under 
laissez-faire principles and to succeed or fail on their own. The EDB was provided with 
funds to invest directly in industrial ventures4, which in practice went mainly into joint 
ventures with foreign investors. Its role was to provide seed or venture capital, and it 
tended to sell off its interests to private investors after the ventures got underway. Thus 
the multinationals were able to operate in the same competitive market conditions as 
everybody else”. Finally, strong property rights have been an important facet in attracting 
foreign investment, as foreigners investing in Singapore did not have to worry about 
losing their assets to seizure. 
Freedom from Bureaucratic Hassles  
Foreign companies faced the same requirements as those placed on locally owned firms. 
These firms only had to deal with one agency, the EDB, which had significant influence 
with other agencies on issues of foreign investment proposals (Soon & Stoever, 1996). In 
many developing countries, foreign investment entailed high amounts of paperwork and 
bureaucratic hassles. In addition, Singapore has had clearly defined and consistently 
applied rules, and is well known for cooperating with MNCs in solving problems and 
using internal cooperation to find a speedy solution (Schein, 1997). 
General Economic Factors 
Abundance of Cheap Labor 
In the 1960s, Singapore offered foreign firms low local labor costs. Singapore, which had 
undergone a few disastrous labor strikes in the 1950s, had put in place new measures to 
prevent labor strife and pave the way for pro-business directives (Soon & Stoever, 1996). 
The government was able to get the labor unions to acquiesce to their policies, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The EDB was established by the Singaporean government in 1961 with a budget of $100 million dollars 
(Tan, 1999).	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would help serve to keep the costs of labor low. While offering low labor costs, 
Singapore also boasted a comparatively well-educated, widely English speaking, and 
entrepreneurial labor force. The country would continue to offer foreign firms low cost 
labor until the mid-1980s when rising wages would force Singapore to readjust its 
competitive position. 
Open Economy 
Following the Singapore’s withdrawal from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, 
Singapore soon began to adopt outward-oriented policies. Besides a few years with tariffs 
for infant industry protection, Singapore adopted mostly laissez faire economic policies. 
Of the four Asian Tigers, Hong Kong relied the most on a laissez faire approach, 
followed by Singapore, with Taiwan and South Korea more closed and relying on 
government intervention and foreign aid. Singapore differed from Hong Kong in that it 
boosted its savings rate by forcing contributions to its Central Provident Fund (CPF). The 
country then was able to fuel significant investment, and to avoid significant GDP 
deficits, by channeling funds from the CPF. Singapore also boasted liberal immigration 
policies for foreign professionals and skilled workers, who faced far fewer challenges in 
immigrating to Singapore than most other developing countries.      
Conducive Investment Climate 
A fairly unique characteristic of Singapore’s foreign investment policies were the 
minimal restrictions, while the few restrictions in place for foreign businesses were 
continually reduced. “The government worked hard to keep Singapore an attractive place 
to invest. It tried to maintain contacts with investors, learn what their complaints and 
problems were, and take corrective actions where possible. As a sign of its willingness to 
safeguard foreign companies' interests, it signed investment guarantees with a number of 
countries” (Soon & Stoever, 1996, p. 333). Apart from the oil crisis in the mid 1970s and 
a couple of years in the early 1980s, Singapore has boasted a low inflation rate since the 
early 1960s, which has served to reduce investor fears and attract investment (Trading 
Economics, 2013). 
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Labor Training and Subsidies 
As Singapore lacks natural resources, it has recognized the importance of manpower 
development from the beggining. Consequently, the country began to put stock in 
investing in education and vocational training. The government has continually upgraded 
the labor pool, especially from its “Second Industrial Revolution” beginning in 1979, as 
later sections of this paper will show. In addition, subsidies were offered to foreign 
enterprises to train and support local labor. 
EDB Characteristics 
In the 1960s, foreign investment was proactively sought by the EDB and by senior 
ministers of the government, who traveled abroad to promote the country’s investment 
opportunities. EDB satellite sites were soon put in place in New York and Hong Kong, 
and throughout the years in more and more cities and countries around the world. The 
EDB proved to be a “one-stop service” for foreign firms, by serving as the point agency 
in dealing with other Singaporean agencies, and displaying a “can-do attitude” by helping 
to solve all challenges and problems for foreign firms thinking of investing in Singapore 
(Schein, 1997).  
Infrastructure 
Early on, Singapore realized the value of improving its infrastructure. In addition to the 
already established port infrastructure stemming from the entrepôt trade, the government 
made significant efforts to develop the country’s physical infrastructure in the 1960s. The 
Jurong Industrial Estate, and other industrial estates built in the 1960s, provided all the 
necessary facilities and services for attracting foreign investment (Soon & Stoever, 
1996). Ongoing development of transportation, telecommunications and financial 
services, as well as the increased quality and quantity of living amenities, aided in the 
country’s draw for foreign investors. Singapore’s port has been upgraded significantly 
over the years, as well as its roads, water resources, and its housing, the latter three 
helping to create a clean and safe urban environment (Schein, 1997). Singapore’s 
upgrades in infrastructure have carried over to this day and continue to provide the 
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country with a comparative advantage. Singapore’s port has been the busiest port in the 
world in measurements of shipping tonnage (Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, 
2013). Changi Airport, which opened in 1981, is one of the most recognized and awarded 
airports in the world, and currently the 7th busiest (Changi Airport, 2013). 
2.4 Timeline from 1960-1980: The EDB, MNCs and Foreign 
Investment, and Foreign Labor 
The flying geese pattern of economic development, coined by Akamatsu Kaname in the 
1930s, is very relevant in the discussion of Singapore’s economic growth story. The 
theory shows how an underdeveloped country can quite rapidly become developed, by 
effectively adopting industries from industrialized countries. Products produced are 
initially simple and cheap, but gradually the products become more expensive and of 
higher quality. When the procedure is repeated many times, a rapid process of economic 
development ensues (Korhonen, 1994). As the following model on the structural 
transformation in Asia shows (Figure 1), the latest comers to industrialization begin with 
producing garments (shoes, clothing, etc.) which are labor intensive. The latest coming 
country has a competitive advantage in these labor intensive endeavors because of 
abundant and cheap labor. Japan, and the NIEs (Asian Tigers), many years previously 
lost their advantage in garments to other developing Asian countries because of rising 
wages.5 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) refer to the four Asian countries of Singapore, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Taiwan who all experienced high levels of economic growth in the second half of the 20th 
century. These countries are also referred to as the Asian Tigers. 
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Figure 1 Structural Tranformation of Asian Economies 
 
Source: (Okita cited in Ho, 2012) 
Figure 1 shows that the story of Asian growth has been one of catch-up, and follow the 
leader. The story began with Japan, which had its own period of playing catch-up with 
the industrialized countries of the West. It then continued with the NIEs trying to follow 
Japan’s economic success. The ASEAN4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Phillipines) then followed the footsteps (economic growth) of the NIEs. The late comers, 
like China, have sought to follow the ASEAN4, and the latest comers, such as Vietnam 
(and India), are now followers of the late comers. In the early 1960s, when the authors’ 
story of Singapore starts, the country was underdeveloped and unindustrialized, but on 
the verge of making its own structural transformation. At this time, Singapore was 
manufacturing garments, toys, textiles and mosquito coils (Wong, 2007).  
Singapore’s initial growth strategy in the late 1950s and early 1960s was import 
substitution, but would soon find out that industrializing behind tariff walls was not 
viable for a small country with no raw materials (Soon & Stoever, 1996). These factors 
would drive Singapore to becoming a harbinger of the export-led, foreign investment 
driven growth strategy, which would come to be often used and praised among 
developing countries, especially other South East Asian industrializers. Yet, while other 
NIEs such as Taiwan and South Korea relied on local entrepreneurs and local capital 
inputs in their export-led growth strategies, Singapore came to rely primarily on MNC 
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investments.   
The EDB was the government’s vehicle for industrialization and attracting foreign 
investment. According to Dr. Goh Keng Swee, 
“To bring about...economic transformation, on which our survival depends, the 
Government cannot adopt a purely laissez faire attitude. Nor can it play a simple 
administrative role of just maintaining civil stability and providing the basic 
essential services. To initiate the road to industrialisation, the Government has to 
play a positive and direct role. The Economic Development Board (EDB) which 
we seek to set up under the authority of the Bill now before the House will be the 
agency of Government to direct this transformation of Singapore's economy.” 
(Goh cited in Wong, 2007, p. 14) 
The EDB faced the difficult task of convincing foreigners to invest their money in 
Singapore, many of whom that could not even place Singapore on a map (Wong, 2007).  
It engaged in cold calling, interaction with CEOs, and the opening of overseas offices to 
sell the idea of investing in Singapore (Wong, 2007). Finally, it made the industrial 
environment of Singapore more attractive, and paved the way for MNC investments, with 
the creation of several large-scale industrial sites, including the Jurong Industrial Estate. 
These offered excellent physical infrastructure at subsidized rates, and were even more 
attractive when combined with the country’s relatively skilled yet low cost labor. An 
early success story of EDB cooperation was the creation of the Jurong Shipyard, which 
was built through a joint venture between the EDB and a Japanese firm (Soon & Stoever, 
1996). 
The government of Singapore would completely embrace the foreign investment strategy 
by the late 1960s. In 1967, the Economic Expansion Act was introduced which would 
provide additional fiscal incentives for foreign investment into Singapore (Soon & 
Stoever, 1996). In 1968, the government initiated a reorganization of the EDB so as to 
make the organization’s objectives clear. The EDB initially included a Finance Division, 
an Investment Promotion Division, a Projects Divisions and an Industrial Facilities 
Division. Both the Industrial Facilities Division (becoming the JTC) and Finance 
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Division (Development Bank of Singapore) were spun off, so as to leave only Investment 
Promotion and the Projects Division under the scope of the EDB (Soon & Stoever, 1996). 
At the time, world trade and investment flows were surging and American and European 
companies sought after new off-shore manufacturing sites (Porter, et al., 2008). This, 
coupled with Singapore’s strong campaign to attract foreign investment, set the stage for 
Singapore as a viable location for foreign MNCs. Manufacturing factories, especially 
those involved in electronics, were among the first entrants to Singapore (Porter, et al., 
2008). Texas Instruments Singapore, established in 1968, was the first semiconductor 
company to take advantage of the government's industrialization program (METI, 2003). 
Their S$6 million deal to manufacture semiconductors and integrated circuits heralded 
the beginning of Singapore’s electronics industry (EDB, 2013a). By 1969, seven major 
firms in the electronics industry, including SGS, Fairchild, and National Semiconductor 
had located plants in Singapore, mostly manufacturing components to be sent back to 
their American parent companies (Porter, et al., 2008). Philips, which had previously 
built trading offices in Singapore, and others, such as STMicroelectronics, took 
advantage of EDB support and began manufacturing operations (Sabhlok, 2001). 
“Philips…was assisted in manpower sourcing through EDB’s network, tax incentives and 
research grants. STMicroelectronics received assistance in the leasing of land for its 
factories” (Sabhlok, 2001, p. 29). Tandon established operations in 1971, and Hewlett 
Packard in 1972, attracted to Singapore because of engineers who spoke English, tax 
incentives, suppliers, and market availability (Hiratsuka, 2011). 
The role and culture of Singapore’s EDB are the topic of Edgar Schein’s Strategic 
Pragmatism, in which he discussed many of the ways in which the EDB targeted foreign 
firms in their early years. He wrote of the EDB wooing Hewlett Packard (HP), when the 
firm was thinking of building a manufacturing facility outside of the United States to 
capitalize on low labor costs. When Clyde Coombs, the HP employee in charge of 
relocating manufacturing, thought of Singapore as a suitable country, he telephoned a 
representative of the EDB. The representative turned out to be a salesman who wouldn’t 
quit until HP would at least agree to visit Singapore and see the country and the 
operations for themselves (Schein, 1997). HP soon found out that the EDB would provide 
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one-stop service in making available appropriate tax incentives, lands, facilities, labor, 
training support, financial aid if needed, and whatever relevant information was required 
(Schein, 1997). Coombs is reported to have said: “If you asked them about something, it 
would be on your desk the next day; if other government agencies were involved, they 
would do all of the negotiating and problem solving for you” (Schein, 1997, p. 20). 
While Singapore’s focus in the 1960s was on industrial development and tackling the 
unemployment situation, the 1970s sought to promote high growth by attracting MNC 
investment in capital and skill-intensive manufacturing, as well as technological 
upgrading, with electronics continuing as the key industry focus (EDB, 2013a). Finance 
minister, Hon Sui-Sen proclaimed a ten-point program in 1973 to upgrade the 
manufacturing sector, including initiatives to: -­‐ ensure an orderly wage policy to maintain Singapore’s international 
competitiveness   -­‐ upgrade the labor pool through industrial training, and provide different monetary 
subsidies for training by high technology industries -­‐ an open-door policy for qualified foreign skilled labor -­‐ a five year tax holiday to certain high technology industries  
(Soon & Stoever, 1996) 
All of these initiatives served to reinforce the continued approach to attract foreign 
investment, especially in the manufacturing sector.       
In the 1970s both Singapore and the EDB became more entwined in the global economy, 
with the EDB creating offices around the world. Between 1971 and 1976, the EDB set up 
overseas offices in Zurich, Paris, Osaka and Houston (EDB, 2013a). During the middle of 
the decade, the EDB had become so successful in attracting foreign manufacturers to 
Singapore that manufacturing surpassed trade as the largest sector of the economy (EDB, 
2013a). As manufacturing operations among MNCs in Singapore began to yield 
economic rewards, some firms extended their undertakings to include R&D activities – 
“demonstrating their long-term confidence” (EDB, 2013a). The EDB efforts were widely 
successful, attracting multiplant projects from US companies such as General Electric, 
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Timex, American Optical, GTE, Bethelem Steel, Grumman and Lockheed; European 
companies including Siemens, Olivetti and Beecham, and Japanese firms Sumitomo, 
Seiko, and Yamazaki (Schein, 1997). 
Although government policies to attract foreign investment in the 1960s primarily 
focused on MNCs in the manufacturing sector, FDI was also sought after in other sectors 
of the economy. For example, the government was able to attract significant FDI in the 
shipping sector by opening the shipping registry to those of all nations (Tenold, 2003). In 
1969, Singapore lifted restrictions on shipowners wishing to fly the Singaporean flag, 
which facilitated the growth of the Singapore merchant marine (Tenold, 2003). As a 
result, within a ten year period, from 1969 to 1979, the Singapore merchant marine grew 
from approximately 250,000 gross register tons (grt) to roughly eight million grt (Tenold, 
2003). 
With growing numbers of foreign MNCs and continued industrial upgrading, the 
necessity of importing foreign skilled labor to work in the MNCs and fill in the 
knowledge gaps in the higher technology industries became more apparent. From the late 
1960s, Singapore began to shift its promotion goals from attracting investment in labor-
intensive industries to training labor for capital-intensive and higher-tech industries 
(Schein, 1997). 
 “To become attractive to the various higher-tech industries, Singapore now had 
to become the ‘precision engineering shop’ of Asia and therefore had to develop 
crash programs to upgrade its labor force. This need, combined with the 
continuing emphasis on internationalization, led to highly innovative joint deals 
between the EDB and MNCs like Rollei of Germany and Philips of Holland, and 
eventually to the creation of joint institutes between Singapore and Germany, 
France, and Japan. By working with organizations that already had the skills that 
Singaporeans needed, they were able to speed up the training and move workers 
directly into apprenticeships and regular jobs. Many of the MNCs were 
specifically selected as targets by the EDB because of their willingness to enter 
into jointly sponsored training programs that would quickly enhance the skill 
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levels of Singaporeans in specific targeted areas. At the same time, young 
Singaporeans were sent abroad as apprentices to selected companies in Germany 
and Switzerland.” (Schein, 1997, p. 48) 
At the same time, the foreign MNCs operating in Singapore, as well as the authorities 
themselves, sought foreign skilled labor to bring into Singapore both to fulfill roles in the 
firms and to mentor Singaporeans. Thus, from the onset, Singapore had an open door 
policy for skilled and professional foreign workers.  
It is interesting to find historical parallels to the economic strategies undertaken by 
Singapore. Many, including scholars, economists, and governments, look to learn from 
sucessful strategies employed by countries, as well as trying not to repeat their mistakes. 
When people started discussing the “Asian miracle,” many would try to understand the 
strategies that the countries so successfully employed to experience their economic 
growth, and to see if they could be replicated. As such, the authors have also tried to find 
historical parallels throughout the years that coincide with Singapore’s strategies, and 
have been used to attain economic growth for other countries.  
The case of Japan in the late 1800s provides an interesting historical parallel to 
Singapore’s early industrialization. Increased factory production in textiles led to Japan’s 
take off in the second half of the 1880s (Taira, 1970). Following the Meiji Restoration in 
1868, a flood of Western culture flowed into Japan, bringing different values, education, 
and management ideas into the country (Taira, 1970). Yet, Japanese government leaders 
at the time understood that Western technologies could not be used effectively without 
improved education which would lead to a skilled workforce (Godo & Hayami, 2002). 
Consequently, like Singapore decades later, Japan recognized that education was 
paramount to increased economic growth. In the late 1880s, Japan initiated compulsory 
primary education, and continued to invest very heavily into education for the next 
several decades trying to catch up with Western countries (Godo & Hayami, 2002). A 
significant portion of this educational spending went both toward employing foreign 
skilled workers and sending young Japanese overseas for studies (Murats, 2005). 
Increasingly by the early 1900s Japanese businesses were run by a new cadre of 
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managers who were highly educated in Japan and Western countries (Taira, 1970). 
While Singapore highly sought after foreign skilled workers, the situation for foreign 
unskilled labor was quite different. Singapore’s biggest problem in the 1950s and 60s was 
unemployment, and prior to 1968, no foreign unskilled workers were permitted (Low, 
1995). However, with the country’s industrial upgrading, the entrance of foreign 
investment, economic growth, and small labor force size, the situation quickly changed 
from a labor surplus to a labor shortage. The government began to shift its mentality 
toward unskilled labor as economic growth necessitated more workers to fill labor 
shortage gaps. Foreign unskilled workers in construction, manufacturing, and domestic 
services, began to come to Singapore in significant numbers following the deregulation 
of foreign workers in 1968, many of whom not from the traditional source – Malaysia, 
but rather from “non-tradtional sources” such as India, Bangladesh and Thailand (Chia, 
2011). Pang and Lim (1982) write that during a high period of economic growth in 1973, 
the number of non-citizen work permit holders was around 100,000, at the time about 
one-eighth of the labor force.  
In the 1970s work permits for foreign unskilled laborers were introduced, including 
permits for foreign domestic workers (FDWs) which would enable higher numbers of 
female Singaporeans in the workforce, and levies for workers in the construction sector 
(Chia, 2011). However, at this time the permits for workers from Malaysia were 
significantly less burdensome than those for workers from other countries (Chia, 2011). 
These permits and levies have remained to this day, as a way for Singapore to control the 
number of low-skilled foreign workers.  
A wholly Singaporean workforce became unrealistic, and foreign labor grew, reflected in 
72,590 noncitizen and nonresident (foreign) workers in 1970 and 119,483 in 1980, or 
11.15 percent and 11.09 percent of the total labor force, respectively (Census of 
Population, 1970 & 1980, referred in Low, 1995). In response to the fast increasing 
number of foreign workers, the government established in 1979, a “corrective” high-
wage policy to somewhat reduce reliance on foreign labor (Pang & Lim, 1982). However, 
during the three year when the policy was in place, labor shortages continued to rise, 
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along with wages, which caused supply bottlenecks, particularly in the contruction sector 
(Pang & Lim, 1982). As it became more difficult to recruit more low-skilled workers 
from Malaysia due to increasing demand for labor and growing wages there, in mid-1981 
the government liberalized importation of all skilled and unskilled workers from both 
traditional and non-traditional sources for a two year period (Pang & Lim, 1982). 
Government leaders spun the benefits of increasing foreign workers to the Singaporean 
public, portraying foreign labor competition as a means to rouse Singaporeans to work 
harder. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, said in 1976, “[immigrants] will do many jobs 
better than the next generation Singaporean would because the next generation 
Singaporean will have been brought up in an easier environment that has not deprived 
him of enough basic necessities to make him really want to work so hard” (Lee cited in 
Pang & Lim, 1982, p. 551). Goh Chok Tong, the Minister for Trade and Industry echoed 
these sentiments of foreign labor rousing the competitive spirit of Singaporeans: “There 
is nothing like the bitter, real-life experience of having to hunt for a job, and finding it 
difficult to get one, to make Singaporeans take seriously the call to increase productivity” 
(Goh cited in Pang & Lim, 1982, p. 551). 
Similar to the parallel between Singapore’s attraction of foreign skilled labor (foreign 
talent) with Japan’s previous endeavors of attracting foreign knowledge and foreign 
skilled workers, history is full of examples of countries that have chosen to recruit and 
effectively utilize foreign unskilled labor. The United States built many of its railroads in 
the late 1800s using primarily Chinese immigrants, as well as some Irish immigrants. In 
recent years, many industrialized European countries have effectively utilized foreign 
unskilled workers to fill in gaps in their labor force; often hiring workers from less 
developed Eastern European countries. Norway has seen the Polish become their largest 
immigrant group, with many working in manual labor jobs, and significant numbers in 
construction. Germany has had an influx of foreign unskilled workers from Turkey, and 
more recently those from Bulgaria and Romania. Some of these countries, like Singapore, 
have enacted different legislative approaches to restrict excessive foreign unskilled labor 
immigration. For example, in the case of the United States, after the Transcontinental 
Railroad was finished, and amidst rising unemployment and increasing racial tensions, 
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the government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 designed to almost entirely 
exclude Chinese immigration (U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian, 2013). 
The following tables show the result of Singapore’s economic policies in the 1960s and 
1970s, and their positive effect with regard to foreign investment, GDP, and GDP per 
capita. Table 2 shows FDI into the four NIEs (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South 
Korea) as well as other Asian emerging economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand) from 1970-19796.  
Table 2 Foreign Direct Investment into Select Asian Developing Economies 
1970-1979 (In S$ Million)    
Country Year 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
China, Hong Kong 50 59 110 271 153 377 255 274 477 648 
China, Taiwan 62 53 3 62 83 34 71 51 114 126 
Indonesia 145 299 254 581 182 1,292 748 235 418 226 
Malaysia 94 100 114 172 571 350 381 406 500 573 
Phillippines  -1 22 4 59 131 114 154 210 101 7 
Singapore 93 116 161 353 340 292 231 291 300 836 
South Korea 66 42 496 4 2 6 5 132 169 172 
Thailand 43 39 69 78 188 86 79 106 56 55 
Singapore FDI* 16.85
% 
15.89
% 
13.29
% 
22.34
% 
20.61
% 
11.45
% 
12.01
% 
17.07
% 
14.05
% 
31.63
% 
* as a Percentage of ALL Selected Asian Developing Economies 
Source: (UNCTADstat, 2012) 
Per Table 2, for most of the 1970s, Singapore did not witness a very high amount of FDI 
inflows. It wasn’t until the initiation of Singapore’s “Second Industrial Revolution” in 
1979 that foreign investment began to surge into the country; this will be discussed in the 
following section. In that year, Singapore received the largest amount of FDI compared 
to these other Asian developing economies (UNCTADstat, 2012). 
Table 3, using data from Angus Maddison (2010), shows the GDP and GDP per capita of 
Singapore from 1960 to 1979 using 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Data from the UN on foreign investment is not available before 1970.     
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Table 3 Singapore GDP (million 1990 International GK dollars) and GDP per 
capita 1960-1979 
Year GDP GDP per capita 
1960 3,803 2,310 
1961 4,123 2,422 
1962 4,411 2,520 
1963 4,848 2,701 
1964 4,680 2,541 
1965 5,033 2,667 
1966 5,593 2,891 
1967 6,255 3,163 
1968 7,123 3,540 
1969 8,098 3,965 
1970 9,209 4,439 
1971 10,362 4,904 
1972 11,752 5,460 
1973 13,108 5,977 
1974 13,994 6,276 
1975 14,549 6,430 
1976 15,588 6,797 
1977 16,797 7,224 
1978 18,245 7,752 
1979 19,932 8,362 
Source:  (Maddison, 2010) 
As Table 3 shows, Singapore witnessed extraordinary growth in both GDP and GDP per 
capita from 1960 to 1979. GDP more than quintupled, and GDP per capita almost 
quadrupled during this period. In essence, both Singapore’s economy and the standard of 
living were dramatically improving.  
Chart 2, below, shows Singapore’s GDP growth rates from 1963 to 1979. 
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Chart 2 Singapore GDP growth rates 1963-1979 
	  
Source: (UNdata, 2013) 
According to Chart 2, Singapore averaged 9.9 percent annual growth from 1963 to 1979. 
If we start from 1965, the year of Singapore’s independence, then the growth rate through 
1979 is 10.6 percent annually. The only minor slump during this time occurred in 1974 
and 1975 when the oil shocks brought the world into a recession. 
A significant, if not overwhelming, reason for the phenomenal economic success of 
Singapore during this period were the government’s policies to embrace foreign MNCs, 
and to a lesser extent foreign labor. Singapore’s policies in the 1960s with regard to 
attracting foreign investment helped to solve the problems of unemployment and low 
savings, and would be a blueprint for economic growth for decades to come. According 
to Tenold (2003, p. 258), 
“In the manufacturing sector, the inflow of investment capital was characterized 
by the multinational companies which came to dominate the country’s export 
sector and lay the foundation for the transformation of the Singapore economy 
from a developing to a developed country, and from a stable entrepôt to an 
exporter of high-technology manufactures.”  
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The entrance of foreign MNCs in Singapore created the necessity to import foreign 
skilled workers in growing numbers. These workers, mostly from the U.S. and Europe, 
would fill in skill gaps in professional, administrative, managerial, and technical positions 
and also act as conduits to enhancing the skills of Singaporean workers through 
knowledge transfer. As Singapore’s economic situation began to turn around, 
unemployment became a labor shortage. Singapore was a small country with a small 
labor force, and so it soon became necessary for the country to bring in not only foreign 
talent, but also foreign unskilled labor. While at first the foreign workers came mostly 
from Malaysia, soon enough the labor influx was broadened to include non-traditional 
sources from the rest of neighboring and developing Asia.  
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Chapter 3 Foreign MNCs and Labor in the 1980s  
3.1 Introduction: The Foreign Dimension in the 1980s 
The 1980s were a pivotal decade for Singapore and its further growth and 
industrialization.  From 1979 to 1985, Singapore would undergo its “Second Industrial 
Revolution”, adopting new and bold economic restructuring policies (Rigg, 1998). The 
decade would see Singapore continue to very successfully attract foreign investment 
through new promotion efforts. The government and the EDB would begin the dynamic 
sectoral allocation of FDI and industries that would signal its movement forward in the 
flying geese pattern, and would come to be a cornerstone of the country’s economic 
success. The EDB would push foreign MNCs not only to invest in their country, but also 
to make Singapore their total business center for the Asian region. New policies and 
training programs would be implemented to increase the skill set of Singapore’s labor, 
and foreign labor would become a much greater part of Singapore’s landscape. Foreign 
firms would begin to have a very palpable influence on the Singaporean economy, both 
with regards to production and employment. Finally, Singapore would show its mettle in 
the middle of the decade, as the government would implement counteractive policies to 
overcome a brief recession.  
Foreign Investments and Labor in the Early 1980s 
By the early 1980s, Singapore had already become somewhat dependent on foreign firms. 
The subsequent tables, primarily focused on the early 1980s, show the organization of 
Singapore’s economy and the foreign dimension of influence (foreign firms and labor). 
Table 4 presents the number of companies by type of ownership in 1970, 1976, and 1981.  
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Table 4 Number of companies in Singapore by type of ownership, selected 
years 
Type of Ownership 1970 1976 1981 
Wholly local 1,891 
(52.4%) 
6,978 
(62.1%) 
14,258 
(66.9%) 
Majority local 750 
(20.8%) 
1,895 
(16.9%) 
2,762 
(12.9%) 
Majority foreign 296 
(8.2%) 
732 
(6.5%) 
1,336 
(6.3%) 
Wholly foreign 671 
(18.6%) 
1,636 
(14.5%) 
2,967 
(13.9%) 
Total 3,608 11,241 21,323 
Source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics, “Foreign Investments in 
Singapore,” in Economic Survey of Singapore, First Quarter 1984 (MTI, 1984) as presented 
in Soon and Stoever (1996: Table 3) 
     
From 1970 to 1981, the number of companies in Singapore increased drastically. At first 
glance, one notices the increased proportion of wholly local owned companies from 1970 
to 1981, while the proportion of all of the other types of companies (majority local, 
majority foreign, and wholly foreign) declined during the same period. Relying on these 
proportions and numbers, one might logically assume that the engine for Singapore’s 
growth was the increase in locally owned companies. This is most likely an incorrect 
assumption. Most of the newly created wholly local companies were probably small, and 
family businesses, while most of those with some part foreign ownership were likely 
larger companies. The absolute number of companies with some foreign participation 
(majority local, majority foreign, and wholly foreign) roughly quadrupled in the eleven 
year period. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of the foreign investment by sector in 1981. 
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Table 5 Distribution of Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore by Economic 
Sector, 1981 
Economic Sector S$ Million Percentages 
Manufacturing 8,203.1 48.9 
Construction 224.3 1.3 
Trade 2,726.5 16.2 
Financial and business services 4,904.2 29.2 
Others 727.1 4.4 
Total 16,785.2 100 
Source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics, “Foreign Investments in 
Singapore” as presented in Soon and Stoever (1996: Table 4) 
In 1981, nearly half (48.9 percent) of foreign investment in Singapore was in the 
manufacturing sector. Financial and business services (29.2 percent) attracted significant 
investment as well. Likely the growth of the financial and business services sector 
coincided with that of the MNCs, as they would help to serve and finance these 
companies. Trade (16.2 percent) was also a continued engine of growth.   
It is important to look closer at the manufacturing sector, as it represented the lion’s share 
of foreign investment. Table 6 shows the amount of foreign investment that went into the 
manufacturing sector from 1965 to 1993, both annually and cumulatively. 
Table 6 Foreign Investment (Gross Fixed Assets) in the Manufacturing Sector 
in Singapore, 1965-1993 (In S$ Million) 
End of Year Annual Amount Cumulative Amount 
1965  157 
1966 82 239 
1967 64 303 
1968 151 454 
1969 146 600 
1970 395 996 
1971 580 1,575 
1972 708 2,283 
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End of Year Annual Amount Cumulative Amount 
1973 376 2,659 
1974 395 3,054 
1975 326 3,380 
1976 359 3,739 
1977 406 4,145 
1978 1,097 5,242 
1979 1,107 6,349 
1980 1,171 7,520 
1981 1,073 8,593 
1982 1,014 9,607 
1983 1,516 11,123 
1984 1,057 12,180 
1985 980 13,160 
1986 960 14,120 
1987 1,710 15,830 
1988 2,301 18,131 
1989 3,393 21,524 
1990 2,609 24,133 
1991 1,698 25,831 
1992 2,734 28,565 
1993 3,177 31,742 
Note: Foreign Investment (Gross Fixed Assets) excludes cost of land; it is based on EDB’s 
Survey of Actual Investment by Foreign Manufacturing Companies 
 
Source:  Government of Singapore, Economic Development Board (EDB), Annual Report, 
various years as presented in Soon and Stoever (1996: Table 1) 
As Table 6 shows, manufacturing investment really took off from 1978, and to the 
greatest extent from 1987 onwards. One can also see the slightly lower amounts of 
investment in 1985 and 1986 when Singapore was experiencing a recession.  
Table 7 shows the largest investors in Singapore’s manufacturing sector in certain years 
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from 1967 to 1992.  
Table 7 Cumulative Foreign Investment in the Manufacturing by Source 
Country for Selected Years (In S$ Million) 
Source Country 1967 1973 1978 1984 1987 1990 1992 
United States 27 
(8.9%) 
992 
(37.3%) 
1,601 
(30.5%) 
3,649 
(30.0%) 
5,258 
(33.2%) 
8,037 
(33.3%) 
9,678 
(33.9%) 
Japan 31 
(10.2%) 
237 
(8.9%) 
801 
(15.3%) 
2,874 
(23.6%) 
4,162 
(26.3%) 
7,546 
(31.3%) 
9,093 
(31.8%) 
Europe 148 
(48.8%) 
954 
(35.9%) 
2,005 
(38.2%) 
4,139 
(34.0%) 
4,754 
(30.0%) 
7,161 
(29.7%) 
8.331 
(29.2%) 
UK 85 
(28.1%) 
390 
(14.7%) 
791 
(15.1%) 
1,590 
(13.0%) 
1,896 
(12.0%) 
2,853 
(10.7%) 
2,860 
(10.0%) 
Netherlands 62 
(20.5%) 
381 
(14.3%) 
904 
(17.2%) 
1,558 
(12.8%) 
1,685 
(10.6%) 
2,818 
(11.7%) 
3,367 
(11.8%) 
Germany 1 
(0.3%) 
102 
(3.8%) 
144 
(2.7%) 
262 
(1.9%) 
366 
(2.3%) 
488 
(2.0%) 
666 
(2.3%) 
Other European - 81 
(3.0%) 
166 
(3.2%) 
728 
(6.0%) 
807 
(5.1%) 
1,272 
(5.3%) 
1,438 
(5.0%) 
Others 97 
(32.0%) 
476 
(17.9%) 
835 
(15.9%) 
1,518 
(12.5%) 
1,086 
(6.9%) 
1,388 
(5.8%) 
1,463 
(5.1%) 
Total 303 2,659 5,242 12,180 15,830 24,113 28,565 
Source:  Government of Singapore, EDB, Annual Report, various years as presented in 
Soon and Stoever (1996: Table 2) 
In the late 1960s, almost half (48.8 percent) of the foreign investment in the 
manufacturing sector was from Europe, and almost exclusively from the UK (28.1 
percent) and the Netherlands (20.5 percent). In 1973, the US became the largest source of 
foreign investment in the manufacturing sector (37.3 percent). By the late 1980s, the US, 
Europe, and Japan all had similar shares of investment in Singapore’s manufacturing 
sector. In 1992, the US (33.9 percent), Europe (29.2 percent), and Japan (31.8 percent) 
made up 94.9 percent of the foreign investment in the manufacturing sector. Lastly it is 
interesting to see that the cumulative foreign investment that came from outside the US, 
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Europe, and Japan steadily decreased over time, from 32 percent in 1967 to 5.1 percent in 
1992. 
While the previous tables gave a look at foreign investment into Singapore post-
independence, the following two tables show how foreign labor had already gained a 
foothold in Singapore by 1980. Table 8 contains statistics on Singapore’s working 
population in 1980.  
Table 8 Statistics on the Characteristics of Residen and Non-Resident 
Workers in Singapore, 1980 
 Singapore Residents 
Citizens Non-Citizens7 Non-Residents8 
Number 957,607 40,208 79,275 
a. Female 34.9% 28.2% 31.1% 
b. Chinese 79.4% 49.7% 56.1% 
c. Malays 13.5% 25.5% 18.4% 
d. Aged 30 53.2% 32.7% 60.1% 
e. Single 47.5% 29.0% 55.9% 
No Qualification/Primary 72.1% 77.7% 74.7% 
Tertiary 2.8% 8.3% 10.7% 
In Manufacturing 28.6% 34.0% 46.1% 
In Construction 5.5% 8.4% 20.2% 
In Trade 22.3% 22.1% 9.4% 
In Personal and Household Services 3.3% 7.0% 7.4% 
Manufacturing Workers in   
a. Textile, Garments and Leather 12.9% 19.9% 27.8% 
b. Wood and Wood Products 5.8% 10.2% 12.8% 
c. Electrical and Electronics 27.2% 23.2% 16.6% 
d. Transport Equipment 11.3% 10.8% 11.1% 
Professional and Technical 8.7% 9.6 % 9.9% 
Administration and Managerial 4.4% 7.3% 8.6% 
Clerical and Sales 30.0% 19.1% 5.3% 
Production and Related Workers 38.2% 45.5% 64.5% 
Source: Compiled from tables in Singapore, Department of Statistics, Census of Population 
1980, release no. 4 Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1981 as presented in  Pang and 
Lim (1982: Table 1)  
Table 8 shows the sex, age, marital status, and education compositions of citizens and 
foreign workers (non-citizens and non-residents) in 1980. At this time, Singapore’s labor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Non-citizens refer to those that are permanent residents of Singapore but not citizens. 
8 Non-residents are those who are working, living, or studying in Singapore on a non-permanent basis.	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force contained almost 1.1 million workers, and of these about 120,000 (11 percent) were 
foreign workers (40,208 non-citizens and 79,275 non-residents). Among citizens, women 
made up only 34.9 percent of the labor force, but the proportion of women workers was 
even lower for foreign workers (28.2 percent female non-citizens workers and 31.1 
percent female non-residents workers). The table shows that the Chinese made up the 
largest ethnic group among citizens (79.4 percent), non-citizens (49.7 percent), and non-
residents (56.1 percent) with the Malays coming a distant second in all three groups.  
With regard to age, 53.3 percent of citizens are aged 30 or above compared to only 32.7 
percent of non-citizens, but less than the 60.1 percent of non-residents. Foreign workers 
have higher levels of education than Singaporean citizens; 8.3 percent of non-citizens and 
10.7 percent of non-residents had tertiary education as compared to only 2.8 percent of 
citizens. As this chapter will soon show, one of the major initiatives undertaken by 
Singapore in the 1980s was to upgrade its labor force by improving training programs 
and expanding education. The authors have already shown that manufacturing was the 
largest sector for foreign investment at this time, but it is also interesting to point out here 
that manufacturing workers were most likely to be in either electrical and electronic 
manufacturing or in textile, garments and leather. As Singapore had made a large push to 
attract foreign investment in electronics in the late 1960s and 1970s, it is no surprise that 
electronics had a significant share of Singapore’s manufacturing in 1980. It is a bit more 
surprising to see that textile, garments, and leather still had a large share itself, 
considering that this sector is considered to be the initial building block on the flying 
geese pattern. It could be assumed that Singapore was still in the midst of transition on 
the pattern, beginning to move forward, yet still retaining a bit from the past. The other, 
and perhaps more likely, explanation is that the industry of textiles, garments, and leather 
involved primarily locally owned businesses, without significant foreign ownership.  
Finally it is important to note that foreign workers are more highly represented among 
certain occupational sectors. For example manufacturing and construction workers, 
production and related workers, and also a much higher percentage of administrative and 
managerial occupations. Table 9 shows the percentages of workers by occupational group 
in 1980, and validates the statements above. 
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Table 9 Working Persons by Occupational Group Industry and Residential 
Status, 1980 
 Total Singapore Residents % 
 Persons % Citizens Non-citizens 
Non-
residents 
By Occupational Group 
Total 1,077,090 100.0 88.9 3.7 7.4 
Professional and Technical 95,145 100.0 87.7 4.1 8.2 
Administrative and 
Managerial 
52,175 100.0 81.4 5.6 13.0 
Clerical 167,473 100.0 97.7 1.4 0.9 
Sales 131,977 100.0 93.9 4.0 2.1 
Services 112,196 100.0 87.4 5.3 7.3 
Agricultural Workers and 
Fishermen 
20,954 100.0 92.9 4.2 2.9 
Production and Related 
Workers 
434,996 100.0 84.0 4.2 11.8 
Not Classifiable 62,174 100.0 98.2 1.0 0.8 
By industry 
Total 1,077,090 100.0 88.9 3.7 7.4 
Agriculture and Fishing 16,962 100.0 94.0 3.4 2.7 
Quarrying 1,139 100.0 84.0 4.0 11.9 
Manufacturing 324,121 100.0 84.5 4.2 11.3 
Utilities 8,464 100.0 94.6 4.4 1.0 
Construction 72,346 100.0 73.2 4.7 22.1 
Trade 229,759 100.0 92.9 3.9 3.3 
Transport and 
Communication 
119,917 100.0 93.8 2.7 3.5 
Financial and Busimess 
Services 
79,412 100.0 91.9 3.2 5.0 
Other Services 224,554 100.0 92.0 3.3 4.7 
Not Classifiable 416 100.0 95.2 2.6 2.2 
Source: Compiled from tables in Singapore, Department of Statistics, Census of Population 
1980, release no. 4 Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1981 as presented in Pang and 
Lim (1982: Table 2) 
Foreign workers represented 11 percent of Singapore’s workforce in 1980, and made up 
even larger shares of certain occupational groups (12.3 percent of professional and 
technical positions, 18.6 percent of administrative and managerial positions, 12.6 percent 
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of service occupations, and 16 percent of production and related workers). In terms of 
industries, foreign workers accounted for 16 percent of quarrying, 15.5 percent of 
manufacturing, and a high 26.8 percent of workers in the construction industry.  
From Table 9, we can infer that both foreign skilled and unskilled workers had a palpable 
influence in certain occupations. Just non-residents, not taking into account foreigners 
that were non-citizens, represented 8.2 percent of professional and technical jobs, 13 
percent of administrative and managerial jobs, and 7.3 percent of service jobs; likely 
almost all of these were foreign skilled workers. Fully 22.1 percent of construction 
workers were non-residents of Singapore; most of these likely unskilled laborers from 
regional countries.     
Table 10 shows an estimation of the numbers and origins of foreign workers in Singapore 
with data used from the census in 1980. 
Table 10 Estimates of Foreign Workforce in Singapore by Source and Resident 
Statusa 
 Permanent 
Residents (non-
citizens)b 
 
Non-residents 
Malaysia 17,446  80,000+ 
Indonesia 1,322  4,000+ 
China and Taiwan 965  1,300+ 
South Asia (b) 4,160  
30,000+ 
Other Asian (c) 9,326  
Europe 8,787  1,200 
U.S.A. and Canada 3,408  277 
Other 231  68 
Unknown 19,152  630 
Subtotal 64,797  97,475 
TOTAL  162,27  
Notes: a Country estimates for noncitizen resident and nonresident workers was derived by 
taking the population in Singapore of permanent resident and nonresidents from 
each country and multiplying these by the labor force participation rate for 
permanent residents and nonresidents, respectively. 
b Includes Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka.  
c Primarily Thailand and the Philippines. 
 
Sources: Census of Population, 1980. Releases Nos. 2 and 4. As presented in Stahl (1984: 
Table 1) 
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The majority of the immigrant workers in Singapore in 1980, according to the estimates, 
came from Malaysia. Yet, even this data is assumed to be conservative, and does not take 
into account the Malaysians that commute daily for work to Singapore from nearby Johor 
(Stahl, 1984). Other popular origins of foreign workers in Singapore in 1980 were other 
South Asian countries, with a small percentage coming from Europe and North America.  
Table 11 shows population statistics of Singaporean citizens by country of birth. 
Table 11 Population by Country of Birth, Singapore Citizenship and Sex 
 TOTAL SINGAPORE CITIZENS 
Country of Birth Persons Males Females Persons Males Females 
Singapore 1,886,793 965,050 921,743 1,875,260 959,484 915,776 
Outside Singapore 527,152 266,710 260,442 319,020 158,875 160,145 
Penisular Malaysia 228,349 111,939 116,410 100,906 47,556 53,350 
Sabah-Sarawak 4,813 2,193 2,620 2,232 911 1,321 
Indonesia 27,113 13,024 14,089 16,220 8,633 7,587 
Philippines and 
Thailand 
5,826 2,046 3,780 711 299 412 
China, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan 
189,262 90,787 98,475 171,703 82,297 89,406 
India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Sri 
Lanka 
42,379 30,448 11,931 24,900 18,050 6,850 
Other Asian Countries 11,109 6,123 4,986 1,129 529 600 
Others 18,301 10,150 8,151 1,219 600 619 
Total 2,413,945 1,231,760 1,182,185 2,194,280 1,118,359 1,075,921 
Sources: Compiled from Census of Population, 1980, Singapore. Release No. 2, Table 5 As 
presented in Stahl (1984: Table 2) 
According to Table 11, besides the already significant numbers of non-residents and non-
citizens in Singapore in 1980, the country had already naturalized many foreign born 
persons. According to the table, 319,020 people who were not born in Singapore, were 
subsequently granted Singaporean citizenship. When this is added to the numbers of 
foreign people living and working in Singapore without citizenship status, estimated 
between 160,000 and 220,000 in 1980, then we can see that Singapore had significant 
foreign representation in the population and the work force (Stahl, 1984). This shows that 
Singapore was able to acquire a significant amount of human capital that was paid for 
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elsewhere (Stahl, 1984). People born in Peninsular Malaysia, not surprisingly, 
represented the largest group overall in terms of total Singaporean residents, but  people 
born in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan represented the largest group that subsequently 
became Singaporean citizens. 
3.2 “The Second Industrial Revolution” 
The efforts of the Singaporean government and the EDB would continue to attract 
foreign investment and make Singapore a trailblazer in South East Asia in the early 
1980s. Singapore would boast South East Asia’s first silicon wafer manufacturing plant 
and first Apple plant in 1981 (EDB, 2013a). The EDB would continue its global 
expansion in the 1980s by creating 22 overseas offices in the United States, Europe and 
Japan to attract international business projects (Soon & Stoever, 1996). The policies 
initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s would come to be called Singapore’s “Second 
Industrial Revolution,” and would make Singapore an attractive place for foreign 
investment for many years to come.  
Prior to 1980, MNCs were largely attracted to Singapore because of the low cost of labor 
for manufacturing operations. As economic growth in Singapore was causing wages to 
increase, MNCs started looking elsewhere to set up operations. The new policy initiatives 
sought to restructure and transform Singapore into a high-technology based economy, 
with higher skilled labor, and provide new investment outlets for foreign firms (Chellaraj, 
et al., 2009). Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said of the new direction of Singapore’s 
economy, “All sectors of the economy have to mechanize, automate, computerize, and 
improve management; or relocate their factories” (Lee cited in Tan, 1999, p.7). 
According to one source, Singapore adopted industrial policies which included “a 
formidable mix of institutional devices and incentives that are designed to reward the 
firm that upgrades and in some way punishes the firm that does not do so” (Hakam, 1985, 
p. 99).  
The policies also set the stage for Singapore’s entry into more advanced industries.  Goh 
Chok Tong, wrote in the 1981 budget, “Textiles, shoes, furniture-these are subject to high 
tariff and import quotas beyond control. The prime objective of the plan is to develop 
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Singapore into a modern industrial economy based on science, technology, skills and 
knowledge” (Goh cited in Schein, 1997, p. 49). As such, labor-intensive industries were 
to be phased out in favor of knowledge-based technological and service industries. 
Whereas in the past global competitiveness meant keeping wages low, now Singapore 
sought to maintain competitiveness by upgrading the quality of its labor force and its 
industries as a whole. Consequently, the goals of the policies (and indeed their effects), 
would be to upgrade Singapore’s workforce and to usher in Singapore’s era of dynamic 
sectoral allocation, which are the focus of the following sub-sections.    
Labor Upgrading 
In order to promote foreign investments in the desired higher-technology industries, it 
was necessary for Singapore to upgrade its labor force. The “Second Industrial 
Revolution” was partly based on the foresight of EDB and government planners that they 
would need higher levels of training and development of Singaporean workers to attract 
foreign investment into newer and more advanced sectors of the economy (Schein, 1997). 
Two programs were specifically targeted to upgrade Singapore’s labor force. (Rigg, 
1998). The first, the Skills Development Fund, would provide subsidies to companies for 
labor training, and would also offer monetary incentives to encourage overall upgrading 
(automation, mechanization, etc.) (Soon & Stoever, 1996). This fund would reimburse 
employers 70 percent of the costs for retraining workers in specific activities (Rigg, 
1998). The second, the Vocational and Industrial Training Board was set up to raise 
educational levels, specifically in engineering and the sciences in higher education.  
Dynamic Sectoral Allocation     
The other important facet of the new policies, and more pertinent to our discussion on the 
foreign dimension of Singapore’s growth, was the shift in Singapore’s prioritized sectors 
of investment. As this process would continue to shift throughout Singapore’s growth, the 
authors refer to it as Singapore’s dynamic sectoral allocation. Singapore had yet to be 
considered an “Asian Tiger” or to be considered in talks of Asian “economic miracles,” 
but a good starting point to these discussions would be this shift in sectoral allocation. 
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The policies attempted to shift Singapore further along the flying geese pattern by 
prioritizing and attracting investment in more advanced and diversified industries. 
Singapore would move from simple to more sophisticated products, and from consumer 
goods to more capital goods. Soon and Stoever (1996, p. 327) write of the industries that 
were prioritized during Singapore’s “Second Industrial Revolution:”  
“[The EDB] designated 11 primary and supporting industries as targets for 
promotion: automotive components, machine tools and machinery, medical and 
surgical apparatus and instruments, specialty chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
computers, computer peripheral equipment and software development, electronic 
instrumentation, optical instruments and equipment, advanced electronic 
components, precision engineering products,  and hydraulic and pneumatic 
control system.” 
The labor upgrading discussed previously went hand-in-hand with industry upgrading, as 
more skilled workers would be needed for these specialized industries. “The emphasis on 
education and training shifted from training skilled technicians to increasing the number 
of graduate engineers and expanding the whole technical education sector” (Schein, 
1997, p. 49).  
The authors would like to briefly discuss the importance of the dynamic sectoral 
allocation strategy to Singapore’s economic success. Alwyn Young, and later Paul 
Krugman wrote articles on the “Asian miracle,” both arguing that there really wasn’t an 
“economic miracle” that occurred in Singapore, and the other Asian Tigers, but rather 
only a remarkable mobilization and utilization of factor inputs. They argued that as 
Singapore and the other Tigers did not rely on growth through increased total factor 
productivity (TFP), the growth would inevitably level off in Singapore and the others 
because of diminishing returns from factor inputs (Rajan, 2012).  
Yet, by adopting the new strategy of dynamic sectoral allocation, and due to technology 
embodied in capital, Singapore did not in fact witness these diminishing returns. The new 
foreign investments into Singapore from its dynamic sectoral allocation “embodied new 
technologies that would significantly improve the efficiency of the productive process” 
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(Fogel, 2009). Many economists (Young, Krugman), discussing the “Asian miracle,” 
thought that without a large residual (without significant TFP growth) the growth of the 
Asian Tigers (due to an increase of factor inputs) was due to movements along the 
production function, subject to diminishing returns (Rajan, 2012). However, another 
viewpoint, is that because Singapore continually and effectively mobilized resources into 
higher technology sectors, and due to technology embodied in capital, Singapore (as well 
as the other Tigers) was able to grow without diminishing returns; i.e. growth did not 
solely come from movements along the production function, but rather shifts along the 
production function (Rajan, 2012). According to Nelson and Pack (1998, p.4), “The 
ability to hold off diminishing returns is a reflection of the fact that the NICs9 could draw 
on a very extensive frontier of technologies that already were in use in other countries. 
The richness of the frontier was manifest in the fact that the ‘elasticity of substitution’ 
was high”. 
To be sure, adopting the technologies of the advanced countries required, among other 
things, high rates of investment in physical and human capital, and the NIEs achieved 
these high rates (Rajan, 2012). Nelson and Pack (1998, p. 10) add, “The basic issue in 
question is how much of experienced growth of output per worker can be ascribed simply 
to the large experienced increases in physical and human capital per worker that were 
achieved over the period between 1960 and 1995, and without recourse to the argument 
that the production function ‘shifted’”. Additionally, the paper by Nelson and Pack brings 
up important points in relation to Singapore and its foreign dimension of growth in the 
1980s. The high foreign investment that would come into higher technology sectors in 
Singapore as a result of its new strategy would necessitate more investment into human 
capital. Thus, it plays into the government’s policies to concurrently upgrade its labor 
force. Nelson and Pack (in the above quote) argued that the high frontier of technologies 
resulted in “elasticity of substitution.” Singapore was thus able to adopt its strategy of 
dynamic sectoral allocation very effectively, as the country could continually mobilize its 
resources into newer and higher technology sectors, move up in the flying geese pattern, 
shift its production function, and without experiencing diminishing returns. The strategy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 NICs refer to Newly Industrialized Countries, which in this case refer to the NIEs, or Asian Tigers – 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. 
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relied on an increase in skilled foreign labor, as technology transfer into Singapore from 
industrialized countries would necessitate foreign skilled laborers to assist with the use 
and training of the new technology. 
The success of Singapore’s promotion efforts were quick and profound, helping to 
increase foreign investment in the desired areas. Net investments into Singapore were 
very high in the first half of the 1980s driven by expansion into higher value-added 
sectors such as computers, electronics, machinery, and pharmaceuticals (Soon & Stoever, 
1996). Consequently, Singapore’s “Second Industrial Revolution”, and the policies on 
which it was established, had the intended effects. Singapore began to upgrade its labor 
force and  change the composition of the its industries, while at the same time increasing 
foreign investment in these desired industries. 
3.3 The Foreign Dimension from 1985-1990 
3.3.1  Recession, and promotional policies leading to increased investment 
During the latter half of the 1980s, Singapore would experience both a slow down, from a 
recession, and then significant growth again, stemming from both previous and new 
promotion efforts. A recession in 1985 would bring the country’s incredible growth in the 
early 1980s to a standstill. However, a quick and thoughtful response by the Singaporean 
government led to new policies that would get the country quickly back on track and 
pave the way for increased international investments and exposure. New promotional 
policies in the latter half of the 1980s would lead to the total business center and new 
growth sectors for Singapore. 
1985 Recession 
Singapore’s recession in 1985 did not emerge from one primary cause, but rather due to a 
plethora of factors. Growing labor costs, creeping fees by Singaporean statutory boards, a 
slump in international trade (especially with the United States), a buoyed construction 
sector, and the strength of the Singaporean dollar, all reduced the international 
competitiveness of Singapore and squeezed profitability (Rigg, 1998; Soon & Stoever, 
1996). An economic committee, created to determine the cause of the recession and 
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spearheaded by the Minister of Trade and Industry, concluded that the cost of doing 
business had become prohibitive, and that the country should look for new economic 
growth strategies (Schein, 1997).The recession itself isn’t very pertinent to our discussion 
on the foreign dimension of Singapore’s growth, moreso these new policies and 
promotion efforts that emerged from it.  
Policies and Promotion Efforts 1985-1990 
The recession, in a way, was a wake up call for Singapore. Much of its growth to this 
point was based on foreign investment (especially into the manufacturing sector) because 
of cheap labor in Singapore and incentives from the EDB. The recession showed 
Singapore that it was losing some of its international competitiveness; a very important 
point to consider for a country relying heavily on foreign investment. As such, the 
government sought to shift its priorities toward guaranteeing sustainable long-term 
development (Soon & Stoever, 1996). Tax rates were lowered, rebates were offered on 
site rentals and port fees, and most importantly to our discussion, promotion efforts were 
intensified, especially in attracting investment in higher technology industries (Soon & 
Stoever, 1996). All of these efforts would help Singapore maintain its competitive edge 
in attracting foreign investment. 
Singapore took steps to attract new MNC investments by persuading foreign companies 
to make the country their Total Business Center. The idea was that Singapore would 
serve as their regional headquarters in Asia, while the firms would place their production 
facilities in close by countries that boasted bigger and cheaper labor pools. Special tax 
incentives were provided for the firms that were granted operational headquarter status, 
and between 1986 and 1987 nine large MNCs had established operational headquarters in 
Singapore (Soon & Stoever, 1996). Again, investment was sought after in higher 
technology, and higher value-added industries. Singapore positioned itself as a Total 
Business Center, with the EDB attempting to attract multinational service firms 
speacializing in finance, education, medicine, lifestyle, software and IT, and denoting PC, 
disc drive manufacturing, and printed circuit boards as sunrise industries (EDB, 2013a). 
In 1985, the government gave S$100 million to the EDB to establish a Venture Capital 
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Fund so as to invest in new technology companies and promote entrepreneurship (Koh & 
Wong, 2005; Soon & Stoever, 1996). The EDB had a busy year in 1988, creating the 
Strategic Business Unit for Biotechnology to aid this newly forming sector, the Science 
Park to encourage private sector R&D, and the Robot Leasing Scheme to aid 
manufacturers seeking to automate operations (EDB, 2013a). Singaporean ministers 
visited the United States, Europe, and Japan advertising Singapore’s strategic location 
and superior infrastructure (Soon & Stoever, 1996). They also promoted the largely 
English speaking workforce, and highlighted that continuing education and training of the 
labor force was producing capable local managers to run regional operations (Soon & 
Stoever, 1996).         
Foreign Investment into Singapore in the 1980s 
Singapore has always been at the forefront in Asia in terms of using new, and untested 
strategies to enhance foreign investment and economic growth. The 1980s were no 
different. The country, in addition to promoting the Total Business Center and dynamic 
sectoral allocation, also continually relied on the strategy of reducing restrictions on 
foreign companies’ operations. Whereas many Asian countries at the time required that 
foreign firms engage in joint ventures and mergers with domestic firms (and some, like 
China, that still do to some extent), so as to encourage learning and technology transfer, 
Singapore was making it easier and easier for foreign firms to enter. “By the late 1980s, 
Singapore boasted that it made no distinction between local and foreign capital in most 
sectors and that it allowed foreign companies to form wholly owned foreign subsidiaries 
just as easily as joint ventures with local partners” (Soon & Stoever, 1996, p. 330). 
William A. Stoever proposed the following model (Figure 2) that shows the stages of a 
developing country’s policies toward foreign investment. 
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Figure 2 Evolution or "Stages" of Developing Country Policy toward Foreign 
Investment  
	  
Source: (Soon & Stoever, 1996: Figure 1) 
In the 1950s, Singapore was at Stage 1 in Figure 2, relatively unattractive to foreign 
investment. In the 1960s, Singapore began to move to Stage 2a by offering subsidies and 
encouraging foreign investment. In the 1960s and 70s, Singapore also managed to break 
through to Stage 2c by having an abundance of semi-skilled English speakers and 
attracting labor-intensive investment, especially in the manufacturing sector. Singapore 
has never really moved into Stage 2b, involving a growing market and foreign enterprises 
investing to reach the local market, due to its small market size. 
The 1980s, however, was when Singapore really managed to make inroads into this 
model, and when foreign investment began to surge into the country. Although 
Singapore’s market has always been small, and lacking with regard to Stage 2b, the 
country was able to convince foreign firms to use Singapore as their Asian base to 
conduct business with larger Asian markets. All of the labor and sector upgrading 
beginning in the “Second Industrial Revolution” would lead Singapore into Stage 3, 
whereby the country began to attract higher technology and more capital intensive 
investment. By the end of the 1980s, Singapore began to move into Stage 4. Singapore 
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had reduced almost all restrictions on foreign firms and would treat them the same as 
domestic firms. As such, Singapore was allowing market forces to play a greater role in 
attracting foreign investments.10  
Table 12 shows the amount of FDI into the Asian Tigers and other Asian developing 
economies from 1980 to 1989 in $US millions.  
Table 12 Foreign Direct Investment into Select Asian Developing Economies 
1980-1989 (In S$ Million)  
Country Year 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
China, Hong Kong 710 2,063 1,237 1,144 1,288 -267 1,888 6,250 4,979 2,041 
China, Taiwan 166 151 104 149 199 342 326 715 961 1,604 
Indonesia 180 133 225 292 222 308 258 385 576 682 
Malaysia 934 1,265 1,397 1,261 797 695 489 423 719 1,668 
Phillippines  114 243 193 247 137 105 157 415 999 568 
Singapore 1,236 1,660 1,602 1,134 1,302 1,047 1,710 2,836 3,655 2,887 
South Korea 6 102 69 69 110 234 460 616 1,014 1,118 
Thailand 189 289 188 356 412 160 262 354 1,106 1,837 
Singapore FDI* 34.96
% 
28.11
% 
31.94
% 
24.38
% 
29.15
% 
39.90
% 
30.81
% 
23.65
% 
26.09
% 
23.27
% 
* as a Percentage of ALL Selected Asian Developing Economies 
Source: (UNCTADstat, 2012) 
From the beginning of the “Second Industrial Revolution”, in 1979, FDI into Singapore 
increased dramatically. This fits with Lee Son Ann’s statement from the beginning of the 
paper. It was not until the 1980s (or in this case 1979) that Singapore truly had a 
significant number of MNCs in the country. Among these eight countries, Singapore had 
the second highest level of inward foreign investment in the 1980s (19,069 $USm), just 
shy of Hong Kong (21,333 $USm). Throughout the decade Singapore represented about 
1/3 of all foreign investment into these eight countries. According to Miyamoto (2006), 
the number of MNCs from developed countries that had established operations in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In more recent years Singapore has moved into Stage 5, whereby money coming into Singapore has been 
investment and haven seeking. As Singapore’s financial sector has flourished, so have the opportunities for 
foreign investors. These include, among other things, foreign investors utilizing Singapore as a tax haven. 
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Singapore reached 3,200 in 1988. Although 650 of these MNCs were in the 
manufacturing sector, new investments were emerging in finance, information and 
technological service industries (Miyamoto, 2006).  
Table 13, using Maddison’s data, presents changes in Singapore’s GDP and GDP per 
capita from 1980 to 1989.  
Table 13 Singapore GDP and GDP per capita 1980-1989 (million 1990 
International Geary-Khamis dollars) 
Year GDP GDP per capita 
1980 21,865 9,058 
1981 23,960 9,450 
1982 25,601 9,654 
1983 27,695 10,298 
1984 30,006 10,938 
1985 29,451 10,710 
1986 29,975 10,900 
1987 32,817 11,743 
1988 36,491 12,718 
1989 39,857 13,475 
Source:  (Maddison, 2010) 
The table shows that during the 1980s, GDP nearly doubled, and GDP per capita 
increased by roughly half. The only off year was 1985, where both GDP and GDP per 
capita decreased. The reason for this, of course, was Singapore’s recession in 1985.  
Chart 3 shows GDP growth rates for Singapore in the 1980s.  
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Chart 3 Singapore GDP growth rates 1980-1989 
	  
Source: (UNdata, 2013) 
The average annual growth of Singapore’s GDP in the 1980s was 7.68 percent. This is a 
bit less than in Chart 2 which shows the GDP growth from 1963 to 1979, but the growth 
rate is still very high. The big slump in the above data occurs in 1985 and 1986, because, 
as previously discussed, Singapore went through a short-lived recession. Because of these 
high growth rates, economists would come to consider Singapore an Asian “miracle” and 
refer to Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea as Tigers. 
Chart 4 presents the comparison between Singapore’s GDP and world’s average GDP, in 
the period 1965-2007. 
Chart 4 GDP per capita (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) 
 
Source: Maddison (2010) 
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Chart 4 shows Singapore’s unprecedented economic growth since its independence in 
1965. 
3.3.2  Foreign Labor in the 1980s 
Singapore even more heavily sought after foreign skilled labor in the 1980s in response to 
labor and industrial upgrading, and as a way to increase vitality in the economy following 
the recession. With the significant technology transfer through new investments, the 
importation of skilled labor became more necessary. Singapore employed many new 
programs from the beginning of its “Second Industrial Revolution” to attract foreign 
talent. In 1979, the Overseas Graduate Recruitment (OGR) Unit was created to organize 
new recruitments (Low, 1995). Two years later, the Public Service Commission (PSC) 
created the Committee to Attract Talent to Singapore (CATS) aimed at attracting foreign 
graduates. Part of the PSC also included maintaining the Professional Information 
Programmes Management Service (PIPS), which is a database of foreign professionals 
seeking opportunities in Singapore. Finally the EDB and National Computer Board also 
utilized overseas career missions in the late 1980s to recruit foreign talent (Low, 1995).  
In addition, the rules for becoming a Singaporean citizen were relaxed in 1981, 1989, and 
1990 so as to increase foreign skilled workers living in Singapore (Low, 1995). The net 
effect of the programs was that the number of foreigners becoming permanent residents 
of Singapore rose substantially in the late 1980s. This is shown in Table 14, created using 
data from the Singapore Straits Times, country’s highest selling newspaper..  
Table 14 Number of Foreigners Granted Permanent Residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Singapore Straits Times, June 26 and October 11, 1989, adapted from Low (1995: 
Table 5) 
Year Number 
1986 4,973 
1987 6,988 
1988 8,823 
1989 12,303 
1990 23,000 
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Relying on data from Table 14, it is readily apparent that the number of foreigners 
granted permanent residence in Singapore increased every year from 1986 to 1990. The 
greatest increase over the previous year occurred in 1990, when the number of foreigners 
granted permanent residence increased by nearly double from the year before. It can be 
assumed that most of these foreigners were skilled workers, as Singapore was looking to 
upgrade its labor force at the time.  
The story for low skilled foreign laborers in Singapore, however, has always been a 
different one. Whereas foreign managers, professional, technical, and skilled workers 
have always been exempt from the levy system, since 1982, a monthly levy was imposed 
on foreign unskilled workers, which has been raised periodically to curb demand. 
Miyamoto (2006) writes that the main purpose of the levies is to make sure that foreign 
worker wages reflect market conditions and not just the marginal cost of hiring foreign 
workers. In addition, a levy was also imposed on the always hard to define semi-skilled 
laborers, considered to be those who had a certain skill and five-years of secondary 
school (Miyamoto, 2006). Regardless, the economic success of Singapore in the 1980s 
necessitated substantial amounts of foreign unskilled labor, especially in manufacturing, 
construction, and domestic services. 
3.3.3  Emerging Problems with the Foreign Dependence 
Singapore continued its phenomenal growth in the 1980s, stemming from policies 
initiated in its “Second Industrial Revolution”, and those to counteract its recession. It 
was also the time when the foreign dimension of Singapore really began to take off. 
However, the decade also saw the emergence of certain problems for Singapore, 
especially those related to its increasing reliance on foreign MNCs and foreign labor. 
These problems include: increasing international competition, a high dependence on 
foreign investment, and domestic firms lagging behind. 
Increasing International Competition 
A primary reason for the severe recession in 1985 was that the country had lost much of 
its international competitiveness. Due to Singapore’s strong economic growth since its 
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independence, wages had increased significantly. At the same time, other developing 
countries were recognizing the benefits of strategies that Singapore had so efficiently 
employed. Many countries began to build their own industrial estates, offering incentives, 
and recruiting foreign firms including targeting similar industries to those sought after in 
Singapore (Soon & Stoever, 1996). In response, Singapore began to change its mindset 
for foreign investment; instead of continuing to target labor-intensive manufacturers, 
Singapore sought to target higher-technology and knowledge-based industries. 
High Dependence on Foreign Investment 
Singapore had begun to become quite dependent on foreign investment in the 1980s, 
which in turn left the economy vulnerable to MNC decisions, foreign tariffs, economic 
downturns, supply and demand changes, and other events outside of its borders and its 
locus of influence (Soon & Stoever, 1996). As Singapore is a very small country with a 
small home market, it was especially vulnerable to these influences. In addition, it faced 
the problem of “picking the right industries”; or as Soon and Stoever (1996) put it, 
Singapore was in danger of “having too many eggs in one basket”. In the 1970s and 
1980s, Singapore was engaged in industrial targeting. By this, the authors mean that the 
country was in the business of “trying to pick winners”: targeting specific industries 
(higher technology) that were thought to be the industries of the future and those that 
would bring economic growth for years to come. While Singapore’s targeting would 
provide many positive spillover effects for the country, it also left the country more 
vulnerable. For example, prior to 1980, Singapore focused heavily on attracting firms in 
the electronic sector. If there had been a large shock to the electronics industry, it would 
have had a drastic effect on the Singaporean economy. Singapore’s development strategy 
from the 1980s was to continually upgrade and diversify its industries. As this strategy 
was highly reliant on maintaining large inflows of foreign investment, it meant that there 
is high probability that the country’s dependence on foreign firms and foreign investment 
will continue and even increase (Soon & Stoever, 1996). 
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Domestic Firms Lagging Behind 
Singapore had spent so much effort trying to attract foreign MNCs to enhance its 
economic growth that it had also managed to neglect its domestic firms. Singaporean 
firms were hard pressed to compete with the foreign MNCs, which “crowded-out” the 
domestic firms. With the significant number of MNCs in the country, there could have 
been opportunities for domestic suppliers and contractors to provide materials and 
components, but this too was neglected (Soon & Stoever, 1996). In the latter part of the 
1980s, Singapore began to recognize the potential importance of its small and medium-
sized domestic firms, and initiated programs to support them. This led to the creation of 
the Small Enterprises Bureau by the EDB in 1986. 
The next chapter will begin by focusing on the foreign dimension in the 1990s, and 
looking at the role of foreign labor in that decade. The it will continue with the foreign 
dimension and foreign labor from 2000 to today. Then, the paper will analyze foreign 
investment and growth from 1990 to present, and culminate with a cost/benefit analysis 
on foreign labor in Singapore. There will be some overlap in terms of the information and 
data presented in the following sections because data often does not fit clear-cut into the 
time periods that the authors have chosen to use to more easily present the information 
and to show Singapore’s economic progress on a decade-by-decade basis.  
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Chapter 4 Foreign MNCs and Foreign Labor from 
1990 to the Present 
4.1 The Foreign Dimension in the 1990s  
The 1990s would witness a significant surge in both foreign investment and in the 
amount of foreign laborers in Singapore. The Asian Financial Crisis would hit much of 
the region in 1997, and affect Singapore to a significant, but short lived, extent. 
Singapore would continue to extend its sectoral allocation into higher technology sectors, 
and emphasize knowledge-based manufacturing and services. As a result, and also due to 
new policies and initiatives, foreign skilled talent into Singapore surged in the 1990s. 
Consequently, the foreign dimension would continue to play a large role in the economic 
growth of Singapore.  
Singapore’s previous successes would help to fuel its successes in the 1990s. The foreign 
firms that had established regional headquarters in Singapore served to act as a self-
promotion to other foreign firms looking for places to invest and establish operations. 
Again, Singapore sought investment in more advanced and higher technology sectors and 
continued to upgrade its labor force. In 1991, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
established new initiatives and incentives to attract investment in these industries and to 
further upgrade labor skills. Sectors identified by the Ministry included agrotechnology, 
information technology, biotechnology, robotics, microelectronics, and automation (Soon 
& Stoever, 1996). In the same year, the National Science and Technology Board was 
established by the government to enhance Singapore’s emerging knowledge-based 
economy, and promote research and development in the science, engineering, and 
biomedical sectors (MTI, 2005).  
The EDB had truly become global by the early 1990s. Alan Murray, chairman and CEO 
of the Mobil Corporation, said in a phone interview in 1993: 
 “Though the general climate in Singapore was good for business, it was really the 
EDB that created the specific economic incentives, provided what was needed like 
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pioneer status (tax relief for five years), investment tax credits, and so on that 
made us choose Singapore as a place to make these big investments rather than 
some of other countries in the region. We do have operations in all those other 
countries, but Singapore provided the best economic climate for the big 
investment and was the best locale for exporting.” (Murray cited in Schein, 1997, 
p. 22) 
In 1990, the EDB set up a special business unit called “China Focus” (EDB, 2013a). The 
Chinese economy represented an increasing share of global economic growth and 
Singapore sought to build relationships with Chinese investors. EDB Investments was 
established in 1991, to offer independent equity investment into new strategic sectors and 
to strengthen existing ones (EDB, 2013a).  
Singapore, like its EDB, was also on the way to becoming a global city. According to a 
paper on global city formation, Singapore represents a global city because it serves as a 
key base for both transational corporate headquarters as well as for leading industries of 
the present period including finance and other service markets, and is strongly connected 
with the global economy through both inward and outward flows (Olds & Yeung, 2004). 
Additionally, the 1994-1995 Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) report rated 
Singapore as “one of the safest places for foreign investors and rated the quality of its 
labor force as very high” (Soon & Stoever, 1996, p. 331). Also from 1996 to 1999, the 
World Economic Forum ranked Singapore at the top of its list of the world’s most 
competitive economies (World Economic Forum, 2013).  
The 1990s saw companies moving up the value chain and intensifying their use of 
technology while the service sector became a strong growth engine. According to the 
EDB, as Singapore increasingly invited talent from around the world to support the local 
skill pool, eventually becaming a hub of skilled manpower as well as a headquarters for 
decision-making (EDB, 2013a). Yet, being a global city also had its disadvantages. 
Singapore’s interconnectedness with the global economy, and especially with regional 
countries, led to a strong impact from the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Although the 
crisis had a major affected much of South East Asia in the late 1990s, the effect on 
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Singapore was fairly short-lived. As the crisis did not significantly impact the situation 
with foreign MNCs or foreign labor, it will only be touched on in brief parts in this 
section.  
4.1.1  Foreign Labor in the 1990s 
Foreign skilled labor had been on the rise since Singapore’s economic restructuring in 
1979, and this trend persisted in the 1990s. A primary motive of Singapore in the 1990s 
was to upgrade toward a knowledge-based economy, necessitating a large inflow of 
foreign talent (Chia, 2011). Although Singapore had begun to nurture local talent and 
improve its tertiary education and training programs, the need for foreign talent persisted 
(Chia, 2011). As such, in the latter half of the decade, several initiatives were undertaken 
by the Singapore government that continued its welcome policy for foreign talent.  
Singapore attempted to attract foreign talent through a variety of measures, including 
liberal immigration policies, scholarships and research fellowships at universities, 
reducing requirements for permanent residence and citizenship, recruitment missions by 
government agencies, reducing taxation for expatriates and upgrading living amenities 
(Chia, 2011). In 1997, the Ministry of Manpower launched Contact Singapore, which 
provides information on job opportunities in the country and has offices in major cities 
around the world. The Singapore Talent Recruitment (STAR) Committee was established 
in 1998, and in 1999 both Manpower 21 and the EDB’s International Manpower Program 
were formed to facilitate foreign talent inflow and move Singapore towards its goal of 
being a knowledge-based economy (Chia, 2011). Singapore began to look toward new 
areas for foreign skilled labor, including India, China, and the former Soviet Republics, 
and placed special emphasis on trying to attract talent from Hong Kong following the 
country’s 1997 issue with China (Low, 1995).  
From the early 1990s, Singapore has employed a combination of levies, quotas, and 
working permits for foreign unskilled workers. The levy is often coupled with a quota, 
which, depending on the industry, represents “a fixed percentage in relation to a firms’s 
total workforce” (Low, 1995, p. 753). Through a variety of policy measures to control the 
flow of foreign unskilled laborers, Singapore has been able to integrate its objectives in 
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the economic, social, and political sphere. While Singapore has always encouraged the 
immigration of foreign talent, policies toward foreign unskilled laborers have not been so 
friendly. These workers can not bring their families into Singapore, are not encouraged to 
marry Singaporeans, and indeed, even a marriage to a Singaporean does not give the right 
for the worker to enter or remain in the country (Low, 1995). Singapore’s strict policies 
for foreign unskilled workers have led to certain diplomatic strifes with regional 
countries, such as complaints from Thailand due to caning and deportation of illegal Thai 
workers, and complaints of maid abuse from the Phillippines government (Low, 1995). 
These two tables below show the numbers of foreign workers between 1990 and 2000, 
and into what sectors and occupations they were employed. It is important to note in 
these tables that foreigners who are permanent residents of Singapore are counted as 
Singaporean workers. As such, the numbers for foreigners would be higher in reality. 
Table 15 shows the composition of foreign workers by industry.  
Table 15 Composition Ratios of Foreign Workers by Industry (Unit: 1000 
persons) 
 Singaporean 
Workers 
Foreign Workers 
in Singapore 
Share of Foreign 
Workers (%) 
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Asset-producing Industry       
Manufacturing 337.7 289.1 106.5 146.6 24.0 33.6 
Construction 76.0 90.4 47.0 184.0 38.2 67.1 
Others 11.6 10.4 0.7 2.2 7.3 17.7 
Sub Total 425.3 389.9 154.2 332.8 26.5 46.0 
Service Industry       
Commerce 232.5 253.5 7.8 33.5 3.3 11.7 
Hotel/Restaurant 91.5 93.4 5.3 21.8 5.5 18.9 
Transport/ 
Telecommunication 
141.8 177.9 4.2 19.0 2.9 9.6 
Financial Service 58.0 87.5 3.5 8.9 5.7 9.2 
Business Service 105.7 191.3 6.5 34.9 5.8 15.4 
Social/Personal Service 233.3 287.6 66.4 164.9 22.2 36.4 
Sub Total 862.8 1,091.2 93.7 283.0 9.8 20.6 
GRAND TOTAL 1,288.1 1,481.1 247.9 615.8 16.1 29.3 
Source: Singapore, Department of Statistics (2000), as presented in Miyamoto (2006: Table 
11) 
While the number of Singaporean workers increased by less than 20 percent from 1990 to 
2000 (1,288,100 to 1,481,000), the number of foreign workers increased by almost 150 
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percent in the same period (247,900 to 615,800). Every single industry depicted above in 
Table 15 shows increases in foreign workers employed from 1990 to 2000. Foreign 
workers represented 16.1 percent of the labor force in 1990, but 29.3 percent by 2000.  
Although Singapore significantly increased its recruiting of foreign skilled laborers in the 
1990s, the number of foreign unskilled laborers undeniably increased during the period as 
well. We can assume that most of the foreign laborers in manufacturing and construction 
were not skilled but rather unskilled workers. These two industries accounted for 330,600 
foreign workers, more than half of the total number of foreign workers in Singapore in 
2000. 
Also very interesting to note from Table 15 is the rise in financial services and business 
services in the 1990s. The two industries saw the largest increases in terms of labor force 
size during the period, showing their growing importance in Singapore. On a similar note, 
the table also shows the decreasing importance of the manufacturing industry. 
Manufacturing, which up to this point, had been the hallmark of FDI into Singapore, 
showed an absolute decline in its contribution to the labor force in the 1990s. As 
Singapore moved into more advanced and more service oriented industries, the role of 
manufacturing became less pronounced. 
Table 16 shows the composition of foreign workers by occupation in 1990 and 2000.  
Table 16 Composition Ratios of Foreign Workers by Occupation (Unit: 1000 
persons) 
 Singaporean 
Workers 
Foreign Workers 
in Singapore 
Share of Foreign 
Workers (%) 
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Administrative/Managerial 121.1 212.0 11.1 37.3 8.4 15.0 
Professional 68.3 149.7 7.0 36.7 9.3 19.7 
Technical 157.2 283.2 8.8 29.9 5.3 9.5 
Clerical 194.6 213.5 5.2 16.9 2.6 7.3 
Service/Sales 185.6 182.4 9.6 29.2 4.9 13.8 
Production Labor 357.0 286.1 116.4 225.0 24.6 44.0 
Cleaning/General Labor 140.5 100.8 90.1 234.4 39.1 69.9 
Others 65.7 53.4 0.4 1.1 0.6 2.0 
TOTAL 1,290.0 1,481.1 248.6 610.5 16.1 29.1 
Source: Singapore, Department of Statistics (2000), as presented in Miyamoto (2006: Table 
12) 
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This table helps to clarify the increase in both foreign skilled and unskilled laborers in the 
1990s. Clearly, the increase in skilled laborers can be seen in the fact that foreign workers 
more than tripled among administrative/managerial, professional, and technical 
occupations from 1990 to 2000. Similarly, the increase in unskilled laborers is also 
evident in that the number of workers in both production labor and cleaning/general labor 
more than doubled in the period. By the 1990s, Singaporeans, because of increasing 
skills, possibilities, and wages, no longer wanted to work at menial and low-paid jobs, 
and thus the country would be pressured to bring in unskilled immigrants to fill these 
roles. By 2000, foreign workers would make up 44 percent of production labor and 69.9 
percent of cleaning/general labor occupations. Towards the end of the 1990s, the mix of 
foreign skilled and unskilled labor in Singapore had given the country the distinction of 
having the highest share of foreign workers in Asia (Yeoh, et al., 1999). 
4.2  The Foreign Dimension from the Year 2000 	  
Since the turn of the millennium, Singapore has continued its phenomenal growth, though 
somewhat moderated, and has become even more internationalized. The International 
Institute for Management Development ranked Singapore the 4th most globally 
competitive city in the world in 2012, while both the Wall Street Journal and AT 
Kearney’s Global Cities Index have ranked Singapore among the top 10 most globalized 
cities in the 2000s (EDB, 2013b). Singapore has continued to seek out foreign 
investment, still offering international firms many reasons why they should invest in the 
country. To this effect, the EDB has continued to serve as the primary agency for 
promoting investment in Singapore. The EDB currently boasts 24 offices in 14 countries 
around the world (EDB, 2013c). 
The introduction of casinos into the country in the mid 2000s, and the advancement of the 
tourist industry, have allowed Singapore to remake its image once again, and attract 
significant foreign investment and foreign spending in different respects. In addition to 
the increasing number of foreign workers, Singapore has managed to recruit foreigners in 
new ways. With the educational reputation of the country increasing, more and more 
international students have joined the ranks of Singapore’s university students. The 
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National University of Singapore was recently ranked as one of the top two universities 
in Asia, and, as of 2012, foreign students made up 19 percent of university students in the 
country (Top Universities, 2013). Tourism and the receipts it has generated have also 
increased Singapore’s global presence and have caused more money to flow into the 
country.  
Singapore’s policy goals in the 2000s were not much different than those from the 
previous two decades – upgrade industries and attract foreign investment. Though, 
Singapore had a new policy focus, which was to improve certain lagging aspects of the 
economy. Chief among these were entrepreneurship and research and development. 
Studies have shown that entrepreneurship has been severely lacking, and even declining, 
in Singapore mostly because of the risk-averse culture and the stigma associated with 
failure (Bhasin, 2007). Inadvertendly, the government has also had a prominent role in 
stifling entrepreneurship. In a paper on fostering entrepreneurship in Singapore, Bhasin 
(2007, p. 1) wrote, “the paternalistic and authoritative approach of the government 
contributed to the general population’s averseness to participating in risk-oriented 
ventures”.  A Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey in 2000 (Figure 3 below) 
revealed that Singapore was ranked Singapore very low in terms of entrepreneurial 
activity.  
Figure 3 Total Entrepreneurial Activity by Country 2000 
 
Source: Adapted from Zacharakis, et al. (2000: Figure 4)  
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The survey measures entrepreneurship through surveys and interviews with field experts, 
extrapolating percentages of the working age population in a country that are about to 
start an entrepreneurial task or who have started one in the past few years. As Figure 3 
shows, Singapore ranks near the bottom in entrepreneurial activity among the countries 
studied, significantly less than that in Brazil, the United States, or South Korea in 2000. 
As such, both the government and the EDB launched a slew of programs in the 2000s to 
tackle these facets. In 2001, Start-up Enterprise Development Scheme (SEEDS) was 
established by the EDB, supporting entrepreneurship and private sectoral investment by 
matching firm-raised funds up to S$300,000 (EDB, 2013a). Further supporting 
entrepreneurship, the EDB created the Business Angel Scheme (BAS) in 2005 offering 
angel investment (EDB, 2013a). To encourage research and development, more than 
S$13 billion was put aside by the government in 2006 to increase gross expenditure in 
that field (EDB, 2013a). In addition, as Singapore has shifted into a knowledge-based and 
information-led economy, the country has increased its Intellectual Property (IP) 
protection and enforcement. Singapore consistently ranks among the top five worldwide 
in terms of IP protection, and first in Asia (Intellectual Property Office of Singapore, 
2013). 
A sector that has been neglected in the paper to this point is tourism. Although the 
tourism sector is perhaps not directly linked to foreign MNCs and foreign labor, it is 
indirectly linked in many ways. Singapore’s infrastructure has been ever expanding to 
cater to foreign investment and foreign firms, and in return, foreign investment and firms 
have served as engines of growth. They have led to numerous foreign skilled workers 
working and living in Singapore, in addition to those working on temporary job 
assignments. Many foreign firms have also created lavish headquarters, building 
prestigious skyscrapers around the city. All of these factors have contributed to making 
Singapore a huge tourist location. Singapore received nearly 15 million visitors in 2012, 
nearly triple the country’s population (The Singapore Tourism Board, 2013). The growth 
rate of visitor arrivals to Singapore is even more extreme than the country’s  GDP growth 
rates. The number of visitor arrivals to Singapore grew by 20.2 percent in 2010, 13.1 
percent in 2011 and 10 percent in 2012 (The Singapore Tourism Board, 2012). Most 
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importantly to Singapore’s growth, are the receipts generated by tourism. In this case, 
these growth rates are even more astonishing, as Singapore boasted a 49.7 percent 
increase in 2010 and a 17.7 percent increase in 2011, whereby tourism receipts on the 
year amount to 22.3 billion S$ (The Singapore Tourism Board, 2012).  
4.2.1  Foreign Labor from 2000 to present 
Table 17 is one of the most illustrative of the paper, showing the changes in the 
composition ratios of foreign workers in the total population and the labor force 
population of Singapore in 1980, 1990 and 2000 (note that permanent residents of 
Singapore are counted as Singaporeans). 
Table 17 Changes in Composition Ratios of Foreign Workers 
 1980 1990 2000 
 Composition 
Ratio (%) 
 Composition 
Ratio (%) 
 Composition 
Ratio (%) 
Population 2,413,900 100 3,047,100 100 4,017,700 100 
Singaporeans 2,282,100 94.5 2,735,900 89.8 3,263,200 81.2 
Foreigners 131,800 5.5 311,200 10.2 754,500 18.8 
Labor Force 
Population 
1,077,100 100 1,537,000 100 2,094,800 100 
Singaporeans 955,300 88.7 1,288,800 83.9 1,482,600 70.8 
Foreigners 121,800 11.3 248,200 16.1 612,200 29.2 
Source:  Singapore, Department of Statistics (2000), as presented in Miyamoto (2006: Table 
10) 
Table 17 really illustrates how Singapore was becoming (increasingly) internationalized. 
Singaporean citizens and permanent residents went from constituting 94.5 percent of the 
total population in 1980, to 89.8 percent of the population in 1990, to only 81.2 percent in 
2000, as foreigners continued to increase in numbers. The ratios are even more 
pronounced in the labor force population. Foreigners went from 121,800 workers (11.3 
percent of the labor force population) in 1980 to 612,200 workers (29.2 percent of the 
labor force) in 2000.  
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In addition, these statistics are not even near accurate. The census statistics do not include 
short-term stayers/laborers of less than one year nor include those who are staying or 
working in Singapore illegally (Miyamoto, 2006). As mentioned before, substantial 
number of Malaysians commute from nearby Johor and Singapore via the Causeway for 
daily work, however it is not included in the statistics. The number of these daily 
Malaysian workers was estimated at 25,000 in the late 1980s and 30,000 to 40,000 in the 
late 1990s (Miyamoto, 2006). There are also thousands of laborers from all over Asia 
working illegally in Singapore as domestic help and migrant laborers. According to a 
paper on migration in the Asia-Pacific region, in 1995 there were 200,000 to 300,000 
illegal or unregistered Malaysian workers and 60,000 workers from other Asian 
nationalities including Filipinos, Indonesians and Thais working in Singapore, and these 
numbers were calculated using a conservative estimate (Hugo, 2005). In summary, the 
actual dependence on foreign labor is much greater than the statistics (which already 
show a significant dependence on foreign labor) suggest. 
Hugo (2005) wrote that of all the Asian countries, only in Singapore is there a concerted 
effort to attract immigrants. However, as this paper has suggested throughout, this has not 
been without caveats. The Singaporean policies are very selective, whereby skilled 
laborers referred to as foreign talent are sought after, foreign unskilled laborers, of which 
more than 100,000 are admitted annually on a temporary basis, are not given access to 
permanent settlement (Hugo, 2005). In addition, Singapore is hesitant to release all 
figures on foreign labor in the country because many qualified Singaporeans believe that 
the extensive foreign labor reduces their job possibilities. Table 18 shows Singapore 
population statistics from 1970 to 2010.  
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Table 18 Population Growth Trends by Residential Status (in millions) 
Year Total 
Population 
Singapore residents Non-
residents Total Citizens Permanent 
residents 
Million 
1970 census 2.0745 2.0136 1.8748 0.1388 0.0609 
1980 census 2.4139 2.2821 2.1943 0.0878 0.1318 
1990 census 3.0471 2.7359 2.6237 0.1121 0.3113 
2000 census 4.0279 3.2734 2.9859 0.2875 0.7545 
2010 census 5.0767 3.7717 3.2307 0.5410 1.3050 
Percent distribution (%) 
1970 census 100.0 97.1 90.4 6.7 2.9 
1980 census 100.0 94.5 90.9 3.6 5.5 
1990 census 100.0 89.8 86.1 3.7 10.2 
2000 census 100.0 81.3 74.1 7.1 18.7 
2010 census 100.0 74.3 63.6 10.7 25.7 
Source:  Singapore Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Statistics and Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, as presented in Chia (2011: Table 1) 
A key takeaway from Table 18 is that from 1970 to 2010, the number of non-residents in 
Singapore has increased continuously and immensely, going from just 2.9 percent of the 
population in 1970 to 25.7 percent of the population in 2010. On the flip side, 
Singaporean citizens as a percentage of the population fell during the period, decreasing 
from 90.4 percent of the population in 1970 to 63.6 percent of the population in 2010. 
More surprising, and showing the growing impact of Singaporean non-residents, is the 
absolute change in their numbers during the period, which grew from a paltry 60,900 in 
number to a weighty 1,305,000 by 2010.  
Figure 4 is taken from Singapore’s National Population and Talent Division from 2011. 
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Figure 4 Population Singapore, 2011 
 
Source: (A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore: Population White Paper, 
2011) 	  
According to this figure, two million of the 5.27 million, or roughly 38 percent of the 
current population in Singapore are not citizens of the country. The non-resident 
population alone represents nearly 28 percent of the Singaporean population. Again, 
these statistics are not really a true representation, as the graphic does not take into 
account illegal or unregistered foreigners, nor those commuting from Malaysia to work in 
Singapore. The depiction at the bottom is a breakdown of Singapore’s non-resident 
population, of which nearly half consists of work permit holders. 
Table 19 shows the employed resident and foreign workers by sector in 2008.  
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Table 19 Employed Resident and Foreign Workers by Sector, 2008 
 Total Resident Foreign 
 
Thousand Thousand 
% 
distribution 
% 
total 
Manufacturing 586.3 311.9 274.4 24.9 46.8 
Construction 360.0 105.5 254.5 23.1 70.7 
Trade 401.3 269.5 131.8 12.0 32.8 
Transport and storage 197.7 182.4 15.3 1.4 7.7 
Hotels and restaurants 179.0 120.0 59.0 5.4 33.0 
Information and communications 85.1 87.0 -1.9 -0.2 -2.2 
Financial services 160.6 123.6 37.0 3.4 23.0 
Real estate and leasing services 68.4 43.0 25.4 2.3 37.1 
Professional services  168.6 109.6 59.0 5.4 35.0 
Administrative and support services 135.1 84.9 50.2 4.6 37.2 
Community and personal services 590.2 391.9 198.3 18.0 33.6 
Others 20.1 22.7 -2.6 -0.2 -12.9 
Total 2952.4 1852.0 1100.4 100.0 37.3 
Note: “Foreign” is derived from total less resident , also  residual errors resulted in negative 
numbers 
Source: Singapore Yearbook of Manpower Statistics 2009, as presented in Chia (2011: 
thang, Table 6) 
We can assume that in Table 19, just as in Figure 4, the resident population consists of 
both Singaporean citizens and permanent residents. While Figure 4 showed that 28 
percent of the population was non-resident in 2011, Table 19 shows that in 2008 they 
made up an even larger percentage, 37.3 percent of the total workforce. One reason why 
the representation of non-natives in the workforce is higher than in the overall population 
is because work permit holders, who comprise a majority proportion of the non-resident 
population, are not allowed to bring families (Appold, 2005). Another important point 
from Table 19 are the sectors in which foreign laborers constitute a significant share. 
Foreign workers made up almost 50 percent of total labor in manufacturing, as well as 
more than 70 percent of total construction labor in 2008. Again, in these two sectors, we 
can infer that the majority of these foreign workers are unskilled. Indeed, a Straits Times 
report in March of 2010 concluded that there were 245,000 foreign laborers in the 
construction sector (Chia, 2011).  
Since the “Second Industrial Revolution”, which began in 1979, Singapore has actively 
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sought out foreign skilled laborers and to upgrade its own labor force through training 
programs and expanding education. Foreign talent responded by steadily increasing their 
numbers in Singapore since the 1980s. Accordingly, Singapore began to close the skill 
gap with most industrialized countries, and was able to move into more advanced sectors 
such as finance and service related industries (Chellaraj, et al., 2009). Not only has 
Singapore’s policy toward foreign skilled laborers always been open arm, but also the 
process itself for foreign talent to work and immigrate has become increasingly smoother.  
On the other hand, government policies toward unskilled foreign laborers have been 
much more restrictive throughout the years. Prior to 1968, foreign unskilled laborers were 
not even permitted in the country due to high unemployment levels. As Singapore 
experienced extreme economic growth concurrently with rising wages, more and more 
opportunities for foreign unskilled labor opened up. Unskilled laborers from nearby 
Asian countries flocked to Singapore initially filling in holes in the growing 
manufacturing and construction sectors, and later as cleaning/general labor and domestic 
workers. These workers have been managed through a variety of policy measures 
throughout the years, including the work-permit system, the dependency ceiling (quota 
system), and the foreign-worker levy (Chia, 2011). Singapore has attempted to match the 
supply of foreign unskilled laborers with the changing demand for workers. As such, 
while growing substantially through the years, the number unskilled foreign workers has 
also been (somewhat) cyclical, as the government has attempted to adjust their numbers 
according to domestic economic conditions. Government controls toward unskilled and 
semi-skilled labor, “were relaxed during periods of economic boom (1968-73, 1981-84, 
first half of 1990s and more recently in 2007-8) to meet labor shortages, and the tap was 
tightened during periods of economic downturn (in the 1970s, parts of the 1980s, the 
latter parts of 1990s and the first few years of the new millennium and 2009-2010)” 
(Chia, 2011, p. 16). 
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4.3 Foreign Investment and Growth from the 1990s and into the 
Present 
With Singapore as a new global city and a hub in South East Asia, foreign investment 
surged into the country in the 1990s. Table 20 shows FDI into select Asian countries 
during this time. 
Table 20 Foreign Direct Investment into Select Asian Developing Economies 
1990-2012 (In S$ Million) 
Year Country 
 
China, 
Hong 
Kong 
China, 
Taiwan 
Indonesia Malaysia Philppines Singapore 
South 
Korea 
Thailand 
Singapore's 
Share (%) 
1990 3,275 1,330 1,092 2,611 550 5,575 789 2,575 31.33% 
1991 1,021 1,271 1,482 4,043 556 4,887 1,180 2,049 29.64% 
1992 3,887 879 1,799 5,138 776 2,204 728 2,151 12.55% 
1993 6,930 917 2,003 5,741 1,238 4,686 588 1,807 19.60% 
1994 7,828 1,375 2,191 4,581 1,591 8,550 809 1,369 30.22% 
1995 6,213 1,559 4,419 5,815 1,459 11,943 1,776 2,070 33.88% 
1996 10,460 1,864 6,245 7,297 1,520 11,432 2,325 2,338 26.29% 
1997 11,368 2,248 4,729 6,323 1,249 15,702 2,844 3,882 32.48% 
1998 13,939 222 -207 2,714 1,752 5,959 5,412 7,492 15.98% 
1999 25,355 2,926 -1,838 3,895 1,247 18,853 9,333 6,106 28.62% 
2000 70,508 4,928 -4,550 3,788 2,240 15,515 9,283 3,410 14.76% 
2001 31,291 4,109 -2,977 554 195 17,007 3,528 5,073 28.93% 
2002 6,748 1,445 146 3,203 1,542 6,157 2,392 3,355 24.64% 
2003 18,601 453 -597 2,473 491 17,051 3,526 5,222 36.11% 
2004 22,216 1,898 1,896 4,624 688 24,390 9,246 5,859 34.44% 
2005 40,960 1,625 8,336 4,065 1,854 18,090 6,309 8,067 20.26% 
2006 44,912 7,424 4,914 6,060 2,921 36,700 9,047 9,501 30.21% 
2007 62,110 7,769 6,928 8,595 2,916 46,972 8,961 11,359 30.19% 
2008 67,035 5,432 9,318 7,172 1,544 12,200 11,195 8,455 9.97% 
2009 54,274 2,805 4,877 1,453 1,963 24,939 8,961 4,854 23.95% 
2010 82,708 2,492 13,771 9,060 1,298 53,623 10,110 9,147 29.43% 
2011 96,125 -1,957 19,241 12,198 1,816 55,923 10,247 7,779 27.77% 
2012 74,584 3,205 19,853 10,074 2,797 56,651 9,904 8,607 30.51% 
 
Source: (UNCTADstat, 2012) 
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Foreign investment into Singapore intensified in the 1990s. Case in point, the FDI into 
Singapore in one year, 1999 (18,853), was almost as much as the total FDI into the 
country in the 1980s (19,069). Of the Asian developing economies depicted in Table 20, 
only Hong Kong (90,276 total), again, was slightly ahead of Singapore (89,791) in FDI 
received in the 1990s. Table 20 also shows the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on 
many of these economies. Only Hong Kong and South Korea appear to be unaffected by 
the financial crisis, showing positive growth in both 1998 and 1999. FDI into Singapore 
decreased by almost two-thirds from 1997 to 1998, but experienced a very quick 
recovery, boasting higher FDI in 1999 than in 1997. Malaysia and the Philippines took 
longer recovery times in terms of recuperating foreign investment growth, and Indonesia 
was the country hit the hardest by the Asian financial crisis. 
Apart from 2008, when the global financial crisis began, investment inflows into 
Singapore have really picked up since 2006. Again, Hong Kong has received the most 
FDI since 2000 per the data in Table 20. Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea have also 
received much more FDI since the turn of the century. It is very interesting to see the 
sharp decline in FDI into Singapore in 2008, especially when most of the other countries 
depicted above show relatively little change in their FDI received in this year. One could 
argue that Singapore would be more interconnected with the global economy, and thus 
the global financial crisis because of the country’s strong connection with financial 
markets. However, as Hong Kong is also a financial hub, and did not witness a decline in 
FDI in 2008, this argument does not appear to be convincing.  
Table 21 shows from which countries FDI into Singapore originated. 
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Table 21 Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore (changes in stock) 
1988 1998 
Investors 
Top 5 
Nations 
Investment 
(Million 
S$) 
Composition 
Ratio (%) 
Investors 
Top 5 Nations 
Investment 
(Million S$) 
Composition 
Ratio (%) 
1. USA 7,672.5 21.4 1. Japan 22,839.6 18.2 
2. Japan 6,489.8 18.1 2. USA 20,002.8 15.9 
3. UK 3,920.6 11.0 3. Switzerland 13,350.8 10.6 
4. Australia 3,321.6 9.3 4. UK 9,570.3 7.6 
5. Canada 2,192.9 6.1 5. Netherlands 9,221.6 7.3 
TOTAL 35,799.2 100.0 TOTAL 125,638.2 100.0 
Source: Singapore, Department of Statistics (2001), as presented in Miyamoto (2006: Table 
1) 
In 1988, five (industrialized) countries, the USA, Japan, the UK, Australia, and Canada 
made up 65.9 percent of all FDI. The USA was the largest investor, at 18.1 percent of the 
total FDI. By 1998, Japan had become the largest investor in Singapore, at 18.2 percent 
of total FDI.  
Up to this point, the paper has only focused on inward foreign investment. However, as 
Singapore, and many of Asian developing economies have industrialized and experienced 
high economic growth, they have also emerged as source countries for FDI. Table 22 
shows outward FDI from these selected Asian economies since 1990.  
Table 22 Outward Foreign Direct Investment from Select Asian Developing 
Economies 1990-2012 (In S$ Million) 
Year Country 
 
China, 
Hong 
Kong 
China, 
Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Philppines Singapore 
South 
Korea Thailand 
Singapore's 
Share (%) 
1990 2,448 5,243 -11 129 22 2,034 1,052 154 18.37% 
1991 2,825 2,055 13 175 27 526 1,489 183 7.21% 
1992 8,254 1,967 714 115 101 1,317 1,162 146 9.56% 
1993 17,713 2,611 481 1,063 374 2,152 1,340 234 8.29% 
1994 21,437 2,640 3,283 2,329 302 4,577 2,461 494 12.20% 
1995 25,000 2,983 1,319 2,488 98 7,283 3,552 887 16.70% 
1996 26,531 3,843 600 3,768 182 9,196 4,670 932 18.49% 
1997 24,407 5,243 178 2,675 136 12,252 4,449 584 24.54% 
1998 16,626 3,836 44 863 160 3,544 4,230 132 12.04% 
1999 22,191 4,420 72 1,422 133 8,111 3,796 342 20.03% 
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Source: (UNCTADstat, 2012) 
As these countries have witnessed high economic growth, they have sought to capitalize 
on investments not only in their own countries, but abroad as well. Hong Kong is the 
largest source country of FDI among the countries depicted in Table 22, with Singapore 
and South Korea representing similar, but still much smaller, amounts of outward FDI. 
Malaysia, especially from 2006, and Taiwan, from the mid-1990s, also represent growing 
source countries of FDI. Interestingly, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea 
all have greater amounts of outward FDI currently than the amount of their inward 
foreign investment. From Table 22 it is also apparent that Singapore’s outward FDI does 
not follow any pattern. The size of this FDI has fluctuated annually only to become 
(somewhat) stable since 2009 to this day. 
As a rebuttal to those economists who argued that Singaporean economic growth would 
slow because of its supposed growth based on factor inputs (which would lead to 
diminishing returns), the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium would see 
Singapore continue its phenomenal economic growth, as Chart 5 below shows.   
 
Year Country 
 
China, 
Hong 
Kong 
China, 
Taiwan Indonesia Malaysia Philppines Singapore 
South 
Korea Thailand 
Singapore's 
Share (%) 
2000 70,005 6,701 150 2,026 125 6,650 4,482 -20 7.38% 
2001 20,286 5,480 125 267 -140 20,027 2,196 427 41.15% 
2002 16,249 4,886 182 1,905 65 -250 3,024 171 -0.95% 
2003 12,828 5,682 213 1,369 303 3,114 4,135 615 11.02% 
2004 36,699 7,145 3,408 2,061 579 10,961 5,651 72 16.46% 
2005 33,905 6,028 3,065 3,076 189 11,589 6,366 529 17.90% 
2006 47,576 7,399 2,726 6,021 103 18,637 12,514 968 19.42% 
2007 67,872 11,107 4,675 11,314 3,536 36,897 21,607 3,003 23.06% 
2008 57,099 10,287 5,900 14,965 259 6,812 20,289 4,057 5.69% 
2009 57,940 5,877 2,249 7,784 359 24,051 17,392 4,172 20.07% 
2010 98,414 11,574 2,664 13,399 616 25,341 28,357 4,467 13.71% 
2011 95,885 12,766 7,713 15,249 539 26,249 28,999 8,217 13.42% 
2012 83,985 13,031 5,423 17,115 1,845 23,080 32,978 11,911 12.19% 
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Chart 5 Singapore GDP growth rates 1990-1999 
	  
Source:  (UNdata, 2013) 
 
Chart 5 reveals also that the average growth in GDP for Singapore in the 1990s was 7.31 
percent, just slightly less than the figure from the 1980s. In 1998, the effects of the Asian 
Financial Crisis caused a negative GDP growth for the country. However, Singapore was 
quickly on track again in 1999 with a growth rate of 6.2 percent.  
Singapore’s GDP growth rates from the 2000 to 2012 are shown below in Chart 6.  
Chart 6 Singapore GDP growth rates 2000-2012 
	  
Source:  (UNdata, 2013) 
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The GDP growth rates of Singapore from 2000 to 2012 are very volatile, demonstrating 
the interconnectedness of Singapore’s economy with the global economy. The country 
experienced negative GDP growth in 2001, coinciding with the economic aftermath of 
9/11, and also in 2009, due to the global financial crisis. In 2010, the country experienced 
record GDP growth at 14.80 percent; the highest GDP growth of Singapore since its 
independence, breaking the previous mark of 13.80 percent set in 1970. The strong 
economic growth of Singapore in 2010 was lagely on account of the growth in the still 
ever-important manufacturing sector (MTI, 2011). Overall, Singapore’s GDP growth 
from 2000 to 2012 averaged 5.62 percent, less than other periods in Singapore’s recent 
economic history that were covered in the paper. 
4.4  Foreign Labor in Singapore: Cost/Benefit Analysis 
It is definitely important in a paper reviewing the impact of foreign labor on the growth 
of Singapore, to discuss, in general terms, the costs and benefits of foreign labor, as well 
as to determine these in specific reference to Singapore. To what effect and impact, both 
positive and negative, have foreign laborers had on Singapore’s economic development? 
The points touched on will be discussed in a brief manner, and both foreign skilled and 
unskilled labor will be analyzed.  
Benefits of Foreign Labor in Singapore 
Increased Competitiveness and Improved Profitability 
With regard to the recruitment of foreign skilled labor, Singapore has been able to 
position itself as an advanced and industrialized global city with high-skilled talent ready 
to serve the needs of the several thousand foreign MNCs in the country. This foreign 
talent has augmented Singapore’s workforce, while the human capital costs of the labor, 
such as education and training, were paid for elsewhere (Stahl, 1984). This has been 
especially important in recent decades with the widening skill gap – the demand for skills 
has been rising faster than Singapore’s domestic supply. Singapore has also tried to 
become more innovative, especially in the past decade, funding more R&D and 
entrepreneurial programs. Foreign talent could serve as a catalyst for boosting innovation, 
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as these workers perhaps are not as risk-averse and do not feel as stifled by the 
authoritarian government. A relevant study conducted by Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle in 
2008 revealed that skilled immigrants exerted a positive effect on innovation during the 
1950-2000 period in the United States (Thangavelu, 2013). 
This benefit is also, and perhaps even moreso, derived from the foreign unskilled laborers 
that have come to work in the country. Since the 1970s, high levels of economic growth 
led to rising wages that would have reduced foreign investment into Singapore in favor of 
lower cost countries in Asia and other parts of the world. The high number of low-skilled 
foreign workers in Singapore helped with the “hollowing out” effect from the MNCs, and 
were able to keep the country more competitive with lower labor costs (Thangavelu, 
2013). Singapore has a small population, and thus also a small workforce. According to 
Stahl (1984, p. 39), “Labor immigration can reduce shortages in particular occupations, 
ensuring a more complete use of industrial capacity, and hence improve profitability. It 
can prevent wage inflation in those sectors suffering from labor shortages. It can 
postpone and ease the costly structural transformation toward more capital intensive 
production which the emergence of a labor shortage can necessitate”. 
As Singapore has been able to manage the size of its foreign unskilled labor force 
relatively successfully through legislative and administrative measures, it has ensured 
that it can adjust the supply of low-skilled foreign laborers to the country’s business 
cycles (Stahl, 1984). As such, during periods of economic growth more foreign workers 
can be brought in, and during economic downturns, they can be repatriated or their 
importation curtailed. Chart 7 demonstrates that Singapore has been able to do just that, 
as the growth and decline in non-residents has correlated with changes in Singapore’s 
real GDP. 
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Chart 7 Growth in Real GDP, Local Employment (Residents) and Non-
Residents from 1992 to 2008 
 
Source: Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, adapted from Thangavelu (2013: Slide 11) 
More and Better Jobs for Singaporeans 
In general, more foreign labor can create jobs because a larger population typically means 
more business and more jobs. In a 2004, Chia, Thangavelu and Toh (cited in Chia, 2011) 
contended that foreign labor complements Singapore’s labor by facilitating industrial 
progress beyond Singaporean capabilities. They found that a one percent change in 
foreign unskilled/work permit holders contributes to employment for 2.6 percent 
Singaporean skilled workers and 1.4 percent Singaporean unskilled workers, while a one 
percent change in foreign skilled workers/employment pass holders contributes to 
employment for 1.9 percent Singaporean skilled workers and 0.2 percent Singaporean 
unskilled workers (Chia, 2011). Their data includes direct job creation, opportunity cost 
of Singaporean jobs that would have been lost if not for foreign labor as well as spillover 
employment benefits from foreign labor (Chia, 2011). The increasing availability of 
foreign domestic workers in Singapore has also led to rising female labor force 
population (and vice versa, as female labor force population has increased it has also led 
to more opportunities for foreign domestic work). Recent statistics reported by the Senior 
Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Manpower showed that there were 196,000 
foreign domestic workers in 2010, which came to one for every five households (Daipi, 
2010). 
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Demographics 
Singapore has a small population, and thus significant immigration is likely to play a 
large role in the country’s demographics. A paper by Hui and Hashmi in 2004 (cited in 
Thangavelu, 2013).  argued that immigration was a primary source to augment 
Singapore’s population and workforce. The need to increase Singapore’s population and 
workforce has been apparent for many years because of Singapore’s declining fertility 
rate. The country had a post-World War II baby boom that led to a fertility rate of more 
than six children per woman at its height in 1957, spurning several programs in the late 
1960s and early 1970s aimed at reducing fertility (Mason, 2001). These programs, 
together with other factors, led to one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. In the past 
few decades Singapore has tried to reverse course and increase fertility among 
Singaporeans. In 1987, Goh Chok Tang announced a replacement for the two-child 
policy, with the “three, or more if you can afford it” policy along with several procreation 
initiatives (Goh cited in Yap, 2002). Chart 8 shows the total fertility rate for Singapore 
from 1957 to 2001. 
Chart 8 Total Fertility Rate 1957-2001 
Source: As presented in Yap (2002) 
As Chart 8 shows, Singapore has been below the replacement fertility rate since the mid-
1970s. The country has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, hovering around 1.2 
to 1.3 in 2011 and 2012 (The Straits Times, 2013). Foreign workers and foreign 
 The Foreign Dimension of Singapore’s Economic Growth Elliot Formal 
Agnieszka Wojtera 
	   93 
immigration can most definitely serve as a way to increase Singapore’s population as 
well as, at least legally in the case of foreign talent, to increase the number of births in 
Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew has stated many times the importance of immigration in the 
face of falling fertility rates. “Like it or not, unless we have more babies, we need to 
accept immigrants” (Yahoo! Newsroom, 2012). In another interview, he said, "If we do 
not take in migrants, we will become an old, diminishing society with no vitality and no 
drive" (Lee cited in Loh, 2011). 
Help Singapore Reach its Economic Goals 
Foreign skilled labor has helped to facilitate structural changes towards a knowledge-
based and highly technological economy by augmenting skills in Singapore which have 
been in short supply. Chia, Thangavelu and Toh’s studies (cited in Chia, 2011) showed 
that Singaporean and foreign labor were complementary. They found that Singapore’s 
GDP growth rate from 1992 to 1997 (9.7 percent annually) was above its long-term 
potential growth rate and that foreign labor constituted 29.3 percent of that growth. When 
GDP growth decreased to 3.1 percent from 1997 to 2002, the foreign labor contribution 
was only 0.1 percent (Chia, 2011). A study by Tan in 2011, showed that skilled and semi-
skilled foreign workers have a positive impact on Singapore’s economy (Thangavelu, 
2013). The dynamic sectoral allocation of industries has been aided by the flexibility of 
foreign labor into the country. 
Arguments Against Foreign Labor in Singapore 
While there have been many benefits to Singapore from foreign immigration and foreign 
labor, these benefits have not been without costs. Pang and Lim (1982) wrote a paper on 
the benefits and costs of foreign labor to Singapore, arguing that while importation of 
foreign labor has undoubtedly created benefits for Singapore, these benefits have come 
with costs, and that these costs are likely to rise relative to benefits and with increased 
labor importation. 
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Hindering Total Factor Productivity Growth 
GDP growth is comprised of growth of factor inputs (land, labor, capital) and total factor 
productivity (TFP). Foreign labor raises the potential GDP of Singapore through 
increasing factor inputs (labor). However, Singapore has experienced very low levels of 
TFP growth in recent decades. One argument against foreign labor is that their easy 
access has disincentived Singaporean firms from upgrading their workers, and thus from 
increasing TFP (Chia, 2011). Alwyn Young (1992, 1994, 1995) showed using a primal 
estimate that Singapore’s TFP growth from 1970-1990 was actually negative, while 
Hsieh using a dual estimate found that it was moderately positive (Young and Hsieh cited 
in Fernald & Neiman, 2010). These numbers, along with those from the other NIEs, are 
shown in Chart 7. 
Chart 9 Total Factor Productivity Estimates (percent per year) 
	  
Source: Adapted from Fernald and Neiman (2010: Table 1) 
 
A study by Wu and Thia from 2002 (cited in Chia, 2011) showed that Singapore’s TFP 
growth could have been much greater without foreign labor, because the practice of 
replacing foreign workers with new ones upon the expiration of their work permits has 
led to an inability for Singapore to accumulate work experience. 
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Wage Effects 
In general, as the supply of labor increases in a country with stable demand, the wage rate 
decreases. This is represented in Figure 5 portraying supply and demand curves, showing 
the effects to a country that experiences an increase in foreign-born workers with stable 
demand.  
Figure 5 The Effects on Native-Born Workers of an Increase in Supply of 
Foreign-Born Workers 
 
Source: (Levine, 2010) 
As the supply of workers increases with constant demand remaining constant, the wage 
rate decreases. As Chia (2011, p. 24) writes,  “if foreign workers are used as substitutes 
by employers, then local workers may lose jobs and may get lower wages because of the 
increased labour supply”. Borjas (cited in Thangavelu, 2013) did indeed find that foreign 
workers have exerted a downward pressure on native wages, particularly for unskilled 
workers, and especially in the short run.  
However, Figure 5 relies on constant demand, and the real-world is not static but rather 
dynamic – in other words, demand is never really stable. During most of Singapore’s 
growth, foreign unskilled workers have been needed due to inefficient supply of unskilled 
laborers which would result in bottlenecks and shortages, and not as substitutes for 
Singaporean unskilled labor. Different initiatives and sector upgrading in Singapore has 
often increased the demand for unskilled workers. As such, assuming that the demand for 
unskilled workers is pushed outward at a point equal to or greater than the increased 
supply of foreign unskilled workers, then the wage rate would either remain constant or 
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even increase. Of course, matching new supply and demand curves for unskilled labor is 
not easy for Singapore with its often cyclical growth, but the country has been able to 
manage the size of its foreign unskilled workforce fairly well through administrative 
measures.    
Increased Competition for Domestic Jobs 
Per Dr. Lee’s interview at the beginning of the paper, educated Singaporeans see foreign 
talent competing away their jobs in professional, managerial, executive and technical 
roles. Stephen Appold (2005) wrote a paper on Singaporean university graduates, arguing 
that from the 1990s, the Singaporean government has relied more on foreign labor 
especially for jobs at the highest levels of education and intensified overseas recruitment 
attempts of skilled workers. Singapore placed advertisements in the Financial Times in 
London and Time magazine in the U.S., which were coupled with campaigns on 
television. However, at the same time, economic growth stalled and the unemployment of 
Singaporean university graduates rose; so while Singapore apparently had a surplus of 
university graduates struggling to find jobs, the government somehow believed that the 
economy was still suffering from a shortage of skills (Appold, 2005). 
Singaporean Emigration 
As Singapore relies so heavily on skilled labor it is no surprise that the country views 
educated Singaporeans leaving for elsewhere to be a “brain-drain” on the economy. In 
2010, around 1,000 Singaporeans a month were applying for the “Certificate of No 
Criminal Conviction,” which is a prerequisite for receiving permanent residence abroad 
(Yeoh & Lin, 2012). 192,300 Singaporeans were estimated to be living abroad in June of 
2011, with the primary destinations including Australia (50,000), Great Britain (40,000), 
the U.S. (20,000), and China (20,000) (Yeoh & Lin, 2012). There are many reasons for 
Singaporean emigration, and why it has been increasing in recent years.  
As the country has made it more difficult for educated Singaporean to find jobs due to 
increasing competition both from foreign talent and from increased numbers of their own 
educated candidates, many educated Singaporeans have decided to leave in search of 
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work elsewhere. In the early 1990s the government somewhat encouraged Singaporeans 
to venture overseas for investment and employment to improve the country’s 
internationalization, but this has also sparked further fears of increased emigration (Teng, 
1994). Many of Singapore’s civil servants and political leaders were educated in 
universities abroad, leading to the belief among many that global citizens are vital to 
Singapore’s economy (Yeoh & Lin, 2012). Moreover, temporary emigration is often 
associated with prestige and elitism among Singaporeans (Yeoh & Lin, 2012). Finally, 
with the higher salaries that foreign expatriates are able to command, Singaporeans feel 
that exposure to foreign markets will enable them to also attain higher salaries (Yeoh & 
Lin, 2012). 
Social Issues  
 
According to a 2012 policy paper by the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP, a political 
party created in Singapore in 1980, but unable to make much leeway yet against the 
PAP), Singapore is the third most densely populated country in the world which has 
resulted in “escalating housing prices, diminished job opportunities, an over-extended 
public transport system, increased stress and a general lowering of quality of life for 
Singaporeans” (SDP, 2013, p. 1). Singapore it seems, has had a difficult time trying to 
decide its ideal population size. In 1993, the government stated that a population of four 
million was a comfortable figure, to which Lee Kuan Yew said in 2008 that between five 
and five and a half million was optimum, and current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
said in 2012 that the country can accommodate six million people (SDP, 2013; The Strait 
Times, 2012). Many of Singapore’s Mass Transit System (MRT) lines were built to 
accommodate a population size of four million, but the growing population size has led to 
very crowded conditions at rush hour and the strain on the rail system is already 
pronounced (The Strait Times, 2012). Due to a scarcity of land, low interest rates, 
increased demand from immigrants, as well as speculation, housing prices in Singapore 
have been rising for several years leading to long waiting times and increased anxiety 
over housing (Loh, et al., 2013). In the near future, the externalities associated with 
increased foreigners, and a bloated population, may begin to offset economic benefits and 
cause negative feelings toward immigration.   
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Conclusion 
Singapore has without a doubt benefited from foreign multinational companies since the 
country’s intial recruiting efforts in the early 1960s. MNCs have perhaps played a bigger 
role in Singapore than in any other country in the world, and their FDI has strongly 
contributed to Singapore’s leap from the Third World in the 1960s to the First World 
today (Park, 2006). Unlike many industrialized countries, Singapore has few 
domestically owned multinational companies. Rather, Singapore has relied on making 
and sustaining itself as an attractive investment setting for foreign MNCs  (Chellaraj, et 
al., 2009). 
Foreign labor, both skilled and unskilled, have also played a significant role in 
Singapore’s growth. The influx of foreign skilled laborers into Singapore has fit in with 
country’s economic directives over the years, helping to change Singapore from an 
unindustrialized and labor-intensive economy to a highly developed and knowledge-
based one. The skilled laborers have filled knowledge gaps at the MNCs in Singapore, 
and have served as conduits of knowledge to Singaporean workers. As economic growth 
surged with the foreign MNCs, importation of foreign unskilled laborers became a 
necessity. These unskilled laborers were needed to prevent bottlenecks and shortages in 
the fast growing manufacturing and construction sectors. In addition, with economic 
success and rising wages, foreign unskilled laborers were needed to keep labor costs, and 
Singapore as a whole, more globally competitive and attractive to foreign MNCs.  
There are many historical parallels in Singapore’s strategies with regard to foreign skilled 
and unskilled labor, and foreign MNCs. Since the early 1960s, Singapore has continually 
tried to attract foreign talent to aid in its industrialization goals. Japan had tried to recruit 
foreign knowledge and skilled workers for similar reasons in the late 1800s. In various 
periods of economic growth, Singapore has effectively utilized foreign unskilled workers 
from regional, lesser developed countries. The United States relied on Chinese 
immigrants for railroad construction in the late 1800s, and Norway currently relies on 
many Polish unskilled workers in its construction sector. Singapore, in the 1960s, was 
one of the first countries to employ a strategy of attracting foreign MNC investment; a 
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strategy that has become increasingly used among developing economies in the past few 
decades. While many countries employ one of these strategies: attracting foreign skilled 
workers, recruiting foreign unskilled workers, or seeking foreign MNC investment, it is 
difficult to find a country that has utilized all three strategies like Singapore. This three-
pronged approach, or as the authors refer to it, the foreign dimension, has created 
enormous economic gains for Singapore. 
Foreign MNCs, foreign skilled labor, and foreign unskilled labor have reinforced each 
other to help bring about an economic transformation in Singapore. When Singapore 
became independent in 1965, the country was unidustrialized, underdeveloped, and 
teeming with unemployment. Country’s leaders decided to create the EDB and to seek 
out foreign MNC investment, and later to attract foreign skilled workers. As economic 
growth began to take off, foreign unskilled workers also came in droves to take 
advantage of opportunities in Singapore. Within a few decades, the country was one of 
the most global cities in the world, industrialized, and very wealthy. Singapore’s 
incredible economic growth story – its “miracle” – would not have been possible without 
the foreign dimension.  
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